“When more is less”

Distortions in the Quota Law for access to higher education in the selective process

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the effectiveness of the Law of Quotas in Higher Education, seeking to identify distortions in its application. The methodology of the social research encompassed the following stages: search for the final provisions of the Law of Quotas, using pertinent legislations; description of the results of the Law of Quotas in the admission process, with quantification through the selection process notices and the offer per selection process in a federal university; and analysis of the effectiveness of the legislation in the differences between the total number of vacancies that should be offered by general competition and quotas, and the actual number of the vacancies provided and occupied by quota beneficiaries in the analyzed context. The obtained results indicate that the segmentation of the offer of vacancies in the selection process notices restricts the effectiveness of the quota law since it forces candidates to compete only in one category of vacancies, preventing them from competing in others for which they also qualify. With its technical and bureaucratic complexities, the system of offering vacancies by SISU distorts the effectiveness of the quota law, resulting in a higher number of vacancies allocated to quotas, but that, in reality, represents fewer opportunities for competition. This situation configures a perverse effect of exclusion in promoting educational and social inclusion.