Aprender as negociações entre Estados integrados regionalmente: propostas teóricas inspiradas pela União Europeia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30612/rmufgd.v7i13.8721Palavras-chave:
União Europeia, Crise, Barganha, Integração Regional, Teoria da Negociação.Resumo
Muito se pode aprender com as negociações entre Estados membros da União Europeia, sendo o sistema mais elaborado de integração regional. Durante a negociação e para a adoção de uma decisão conjunta, os Estados membros da União Europeia costumam dançar em harmonia, mas nem sempre. Alguns, contudo, dançam melhor; obtendo assim mais atenção, mais satisfação e um controle maior sobre os outros. O artigo investiga os fatores que melhor explicam suas performances nas negociações interestatais. O artigo se baseia nesses resultados para oferecer seis propostas relativas aos fatores de sucesso das negociações entre Estados integrados economicamente e/ou politicamente, mesmo fora da União Europeia. O artigo se questiona também sobre o que ocorre quando os Estados são obrigados a dançar mais rápido, e quando as tensões entre os Estados ameaçam a harmonia entre os parceiros. São, ainda, submetidas seis propostas adicionais para lidar efetivamente com os efeitos das crises que podem intervir nas negociações corriqueiras. Todos os achados e proposições se baseiam em teoria e em pesquisa acerca de negociações e barganha em momentos de crise. As doze proposições para negociações corriqueiras e em tempos de crise incluem a construção da estratégia de um mestre de xadrez, a influência relacional de um diplomata sobre uma contraparte embriagada, assim como a técnica do puxa/empurra usada pelos mestres de artes marciais.
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