The political economy of UN System operational activities: overcoming the bilateralization of multilateralism through pooled funds?

Abstract

This article intent is to present the different means through which UN activities are financed – such as by assessed, voluntary or earmarked contributions – and to understand how their allocation affects the degree of influence that can be potentially exerted by those who finance the bulk of UN activities. Firstly, an introductory section describes the specifics of UN aid-related activities, in contrast with its normative functions at its decision-making bodies or set at international conferences sponsored by UN system entities. Then, it lays out the multiple forms through which UN system entities finance their activities: from the mandatory contributions, attached to UN and its specialized agencies membership, to the different types of voluntary contributions, such as those earmarked for a specific project or country that by the mid-1990s surpassed the volume of mandatory ones. Finally, we assess what the gathered data inform about the relation between the UN funding structure and the opportunities and constraints presented to actors interested in promoting a less fragmented flow of UN operational activities. We identified pooled funds as a promising but underexplored mechanism to avoid the bilateralization of the multilateral cooperation forward by UN system.