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“They are almost humans like us”: indigenous politics and policy dismantling under Bolsonaro’s government

“Eles são quase humanos como nós”:
política indígena e desmantelamento da
política indigenista no governo Bolsonaro

“Ellos son casi humanos como nosotros”:
Política indígena y el desmantelamiento
de la política indigenista en el gobierno de
bolsonaro

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Abstract

This paper argues that three ongoing dismantling processes target the Brazilian indigenist policy under Bolsonaro’s government: (1) the dismantling of the land claims recognition policy and institutions; (2) the dismantling of the protection of indigenous lives due to the increasing violence against indigenous peoples and the COVID-19 pandemic; and (3) the dismantling of the integrity of traditional territories related to government plans to open indigenous lands to large-scale agricultural and mining operations. On the other hand, we point out that Brazilian indigenous movements’ contemporary strategies are developing to fight back against the dismantling of indigenist policy. We use primary and secondary data to investigate those topics, discussing them in depth using the policy-dismantling theoretical framework. We conclude by pointing to the fact that the ongoing dismantling may contribute to the genocide of Brazilian indigenous peoples.

Keywords: Indigenous peoples. Bolsonaro. Indigenist policy. Brazil.

Resumo

O presente artigo argumenta que há três processos de desmantelamento que objetivam a política indigenista em curso no Brasil sob o governo Bolsonaro: (1) o desmantelamento da política e das instituições de reconhecimento de demandas territoriais indígenas; (2) o desmantelamento da proteção à vida dos indígenas devido ao aumento da violência contra eles e à pandemia de COVID-19; e (3) o desmantelamento da integridade dos territórios tradicionais relacionado aos planos do governo de abertura das terras indígenas para operações de mineração e agricultura de larga escala. Por outro lado, nós apresentamos as estratégias contemporâneas do movimento indígena brasileiro para resistir às tentativas de desmantelamento da política. Utiliza-se dados primários e secundários para investigar cada um desses tópicos em profundidade a partir do arcabouço teórico da teoria do desmantelamento de políticas. Concluimos apontando para o fato de que o desmantelamento em curso pode contribuir para o genocídio dos povos indígenas brasileiros.

Palavras-chave: Povos indígenas. Bolsonaro. Política indigenista. Brasil.

Resumen

Este artículo sostiene que existen tres procesos de desmantelamiento que apuntan a la política indígena en marcha en Brasil bajo el gobierno de Bolsonaro: 1. El desmantelamiento de políticas e instituciones para el reconocimiento de las demandas territoriales indígenas; 2. El desmantelamiento de la protección de la vida de los pueblos indígenas debido al aumento de la violencia contra ellos y la pandemia COVID-19; 3. El desmantelamiento de la integridad de los territorios tradicionales relacionados con los planes del gobierno de abrir tierras indígenas para operaciones mineras y agrícolas a gran escala. Por otro lado, presentamos las estrategias contemporáneas del movimiento indígena brasileño para resistir los intentos de desmantelar la política. Los datos primarios y secundarios se utilizan para investigar cada uno de estos temas en profundidad desde el marco teórico de la teoría del desmantelamiento de políticas. Concluimos señalando que el desmantelamiento en curso puede contribuir al genocidio de los pueblos indígenas brasileños.

Palabras clave: Pueblos indígenas. Bolsonaro. Política indigenista. Brasil.

INTRODUCTION¹

Historically delegitimized as relevant social actors in the Americas, indigenous

¹ A first version of this paper was delivered in the Democracy and Autocracy section of the Emerging Scholar Research Development workshop at the American Political Science Association’s annual meeting on September 9, 2020. A second one was delivered at the Tests and Prospects for Democracy and Human Rights in Brazil workshop, held by the Center for Brazil Studies, David L. Boren College of International Studies, University of Oklahoma, February/March 2021. Figures 1, 2, and 4 were extracted from Soares’s doctoral thesis (Soares 2019) and updated to include data on Bolsonaro’s first year of government. Figures 5 and 6 were published by Soares (2017). This paper is dedicated to all Soares’s former FUNAI colleagues, brave women and men whom he cannot name here for fear that they could be politically targeted. In addition, he would like to dedicate this paper/denouncement to the Rikbaktsa people, where he was able to find some of the most gentle and happy people on Earth. We sincerely hope Nelson Rikbaktsa’s death will be provided justice as soon as possible. We are profoundly grateful to the thoughtful comments of Amy Erica Smith and Emma Coven, though the mistakes and omissions remain our responsibility.

groups² recently observed a growing international consensus concerning their rights related to self-determination, political autonomy, political representation, hunting and fishing, education in their language, and recognition of traditionally occupied lands by national governments, among others. On the one hand, there have been significant advances in indigenous issues in Latin America, mainly regarding constitutional provisions that aim to protect indigenous rights. On the other hand, the growing consensus to implement international legislation has not translated into a solid commitment to forward these policies at the domestic level.

As many scholars have noted, indigenous groups are usually socially vulnerable populations with high rates of extreme poverty, suicide, substance abuse and alcoholism, precarious housing and sewage systems, and fewer years of formal education (Plant 1998; Cornell 2006; Brasil 2010). Their traditionally occupied lands regularly face threats by private mining companies, property owners, and national governments. After centuries of genocide, which, in some sense, continues today, threats like land grabbing, forced displacement and reallocation to small reserves, and destruction of the soil, water, fauna, and flora due to mining, cattle raising and agribusiness projects, logging, and the construction of infrastructure megaprojects challenge the very existence of native groups across the world.

This gruesome scenario can be worsened when an openly racist president is elected. Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro is clear about his stance on indigenous issues and peoples. Already during his presidential campaign, he said that his administration would not demarcate “even a centimeter” of indigenous lands, a promise that he is keeping. Recently, he said that indigenous peoples were “evolving” and that they were “almost humans like us.” Not surprisingly, there is a widespread perception that the violence against indigenous peoples increased because perpetrators find encouragement in the president’s prejudicial assessments regarding such populations and his frequent appeals to invade indigenous lands.

Our paper starts from the premise that Bolsonaro’s autocratic tendencies and populist-style leadership are threatening the recently established Brazilian democracy in several ways, undermining citizens’ confidence in politics, and putting political

² The issue of the choice of the proper term to designate the population living in the Americas before the conquest is real and should not be underestimated. In our paper, we use the terms “indigenous” and sometimes “originary people” interchangeably because they are used by the Brazilian indigenous groups themselves. “First Nations,” “Autochtones,” or “Aboriginal” are often used in English-speaking countries but rarely by the Latin American ones. Jair Bolsonaro usually says “Indians,” denoting his pejorative view of the indigenous peoples.

institutions under severe pressure.³ Unfortunately, this pressure tends to be even more potent over minorities, as was vocalized by the then-presidential candidate in 2017 (translated from the Portuguese by the authors): “We will make a Brazil for the majority. The minorities must bend to the majority. We will defend the majorities. Either the minorities adapt themselves to the majorities or simply go away!”⁴ In other words, we affirm that cracking down on indigenous peoples and their rights is a core part of Bolsonaro’s plan to deal with Brazilian minorities.

This paper argues that three ongoing dismantling processes target the Brazilian indigenist policy⁵ under Bolsonaro’s government: (1) the dismantling of land claims recognition policy and institutions; (2) the dismantling of the protection of indigenous lives due to the increasing violence against indigenous peoples and the COVID-19 pandemic; and (3) the dismantling of the integrity of traditional territories related to government plans to open indigenous lands to large-scale agricultural and mining operations. On the other hand, we point out that Brazilian indigenous movements’ contemporary strategies are developing to fight back against the dismantling of indigenist policy. We use primary and secondary data to investigate those topics, discussing them in depth using the policy-dismantling theoretical framework.

Before discussing the points outlined above, we first present some data on Brazilian indigenous peoples and policies for the benefit of readers who are not familiar with the issue. Second, we briefly discuss Bolsonaro’s stances on indigenous peoples and indigenist policy. It may help to have a general overview of what is at stake regarding the policy-dismantling process described here.

1 BRAZILIAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INDIGENIST POLICIES: A BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

Brazil is among the countries with the highest number of indigenous peoples in the world, despite the indigenous population being only around, 0.47% of the total

³ A recent piece written by the Brazilian journalist Monica Gugliano described a meeting on May 22, 2020, where President Bolsonaro decided to send military troops to shut down the Brazilian Supreme Court, arrest the eleven judges, and replace them with others. He was demoted of the intent by some of his closest advisers in the end, but the fact that this card was on the table suggests that the Brazilian democracy is dangerously walking on the edge. See: <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/vou-inter-vir/>. Accessed on August 17, 2020.

⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BCKEwP8TeZY>. Accessed on: August 17, 2020; see also <https://www.otempo.com.br/politica/a-minoria-tem-que-se-curvar-1.352269>; <https://istoe.com.br/frases-de-bolsonaro-o-candidato-que-despreza-as-minorias/>.

⁵ Indigenist policy is the public policy toward indigenous peoples designed and implemented by nation-states. Indigenous politics are the political activities carried out by indigenous peoples.

national population.⁶ The last population census carried out by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, or the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) in 2010 revealed that at least 305 indigenous groups are living in all states and regions of the country, comprising 896,917 individuals. They speak 274 distinct languages belonging to nineteen linguistic families; 57.3% of the population lives within officially recognized indigenous lands, covering about 12.88% of the national territory (Brasil 2010).

The indigenist policy of the republican period began with the establishment, in 1910, of the Serviço de Proteção aos Índios e Localização de Trabalhadores Nacionais (SPILTN, or Indigenous Protection and Recruitment of National Workers Service), which became the Indian Protection Service (SPI) in 1918, when a separate organ was created for the Recruitment of National Workers (LTN). The agency had a mandate to intervene in all conflicts involving indigenous groups, eventually removing them from their territories and carrying out policies focused on integrating those groups to the broader “national communion.” A few years before, in 1916, the new Civil Code came into effect, resulting in the inclusion of “Indians,” along with minors and mentally ill persons, as “relatively incapable” of exercising their rights as full citizens (Rodrigues 2002).

The leading personality of this period was Marshal Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon, the founder and director of this agency. After commanding successful expeditions, he became nationally famous for installing telephone lines connecting the state of Mato Grosso to Rondônia, linking the Brazilian west to its central region. Rondon believed that contact with indigenous groups should occur through nonviolent means, with the explicit goal to prepare them to progressively live in mainstream Brazilian society. The “laic catechesis” and the doctrine of the “fraternal protection” were the SPI’s guidelines until its extinction in 1967 (Lima 2013).

The SPI played a vital role in establishing a permanent policy that addressed contact with native groups in all regions of the country. However, the controversial record of the SPI’s actions is also well known. There were accusations of corruption, genocide, rapes, and negligence over illegal mining and logging, to name just a few. Underfunded, the agency could not deliver adequate service to its target group and was severely criticized by the media, leading to the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry to investigate these accusations. The agency headquarters suffered a fire in 1967 and lost almost all its files. After this event, the Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI, or National Indian Foundation) replaced it in 1968, already under the military government.

⁶ Comparative data can be found in Bellier (2013).

The Estatuto do Índio (Indian Statute) was enacted in 1973 (Law No. 6001/73). It addressed all aspects of indigenous life within the Brazilian territory. Its explicit goal was to “preserve their culture and integrate them to the national communion,” assuming, again, that the indigenous peoples’ condition was transitory and that their complete assimilation was the desired outcome of their continuous interaction with the state. The statute affirms that it is the state, through the FUNAI, that has the tutelary power over indigenous communities, and individuals and communities would be allowed, through a decree, to be considered formally “emancipated” once they felt ready to “leave” the indigenous condition (Araújo 2004).

The enactment of a new constitution in 1988 brought a refreshing wave of democratic rights to the country after twenty-one years (1964-1985) of the discretionary power of the military government. The constitution advanced a bundle of rights related to social policies, the right to the city, and the third-generation rights. The constitutional-making process itself was strongly participatory, mobilizing many social actors in all policy fields. The result was marked by a participatory orientation, prescribing the importance of popular participation in politics through institutional mechanisms such as councils, public hearings, and plebiscites (Avritzer 2013).

A broad set of indigenous rights was secured through the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution. Provisions on mining, environment, education, culture, and health care rights are present in many of its articles, especially its eightieth chapter (“on Indians”) of the eightieth title (“on the social order”), which is dedicated entirely to their rights. One of the main innovations regarding indigenous peoples was overcoming the tutelary regime, at least from a legal point of view (Lima 2015). The constitution no longer determined that the FUNAI legally represents indigenous peoples. In accordance with the new Civil Code (Law No. 10.406) passed in 2001, indigenous peoples are now recognized as full-fledged citizens who can represent themselves before courts and judicial trials, being advised by the Public Ministry.

The core of the Brazilian indigenist policy after 1988 is the land claims recognition policy. Indigenous lands (*terras indígenas*, or TIs) are portions of the national territory owned by the Union and exclusively inhabited by one or more indigenous groups. They use them to develop their activities and their cultural, material, symbolic, and religious reproduction according to their uses, customs, and traditions.

The stages of the administrative native land claim demarcation in Brazil have not changed very much over the last three decades. It is composed basically of four steps:⁷

⁷ The legal process actually consists of seven stages, as Baines (2014) notes, but we have opted to present them in a more concise fashion.

1. **Workgroup formation:** This provision, first introduced by Decree No. 76.999/1976 and ratified by the following decrees, states that the FUNAI’s president may start the process by establishing a workgroup composed of “experts,” including an anthropologist and an engineer surveyor, but later Decree No. 94.945/1987 allowed other officials to participate, mainly officials of state agencies related to land issues, if the FUNAI considered it necessary. With the latter decree, the group could invite other scientific community members to contribute to the report. This group is in charge of ensuring the antiquity of the indigenous occupation in a particular area, collecting evidence from archaeological and anthropological research.
2. **Fieldwork and report writing:** Once in the field, the work group gathers as much information as possible about the indigenous group. They describe the burial grounds; religious ceremonies; number of men, women, elders, and children; information about economic activities; and political structures. In sum, the report must contain factual information about the indigenous group claimant. This report is the “technical” basis upon which decision-makers will eventually rely on to make judgments and push the process forward. The centrality of the “expert report” is a constant in indigenous legislation since 1976 and is still in effect today.
3. **Report submission:** After the 1991 legislation, the submission of the report is made first to the FUNAI’s president, who then presents it to the Ministry of Justice, which officially “declares” that the territory under scrutiny is traditionally occupied by indigenous groups.
4. **Approval of the demarcation and homologation by presidential decree:** The final stage of the land claims demarcation policy is the ratification of the entire process by the president and requires the appropriate administrative measures to register it.

The 1988 Federal Constitution brought fundamental advances in recognition of indigenous rights in Brazil. However, since 2000, the strengthening of the ruralist caucus in Brazilian Congress—with support from the mining sector, large companies involved in the construction of mega-development projects such as highways and hydroelectric schemes, some evangelical politicians, and the military—led to a series of legislative measures aiming to change the constitution to dismantle indigenous rights and favor agribusiness, mining, and large-scale development projects.

This trend culminated in the election of Jair Bolsonaro, whose candidacy has been strongly backed by the military over the past years before his election. It represents a considerable setback in the rights of indigenous peoples, *quilombolas*, and other traditional peoples and an attempt to return to a situation similar to that during

the military dictatorship (1964–1985) when indigenous rights were brutally trampled on in favor of large-scale economic development projects (Davis 1977; Baines 1991, 2014, 2018). This process is evidenced by the Figueiredo report,⁸ an investigative report of more than seven thousand pages published in 1967 by public prosecutor Jader de Figueiredo Correia, detailing the crimes committed by the Indigenous Protection Service against the indigenous peoples of Brazil.

The land claims recognition policy in Brazil has developed over the last thirty years without significant changes. Even though one could easily see the progressive complexification of the claims in a bureaucratic environment as more and more hostile, the general guidelines of this policy were somehow constant over time. Not surprisingly, the policy has accumulated many critics because of the widespread perception that, although accomplishing some important goals, it is far from being satisfactory for indigenous groups, activists, national citizens, and even government agents. However, its harshest critic over the past thirty years has been Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, who took office on January 1, 2019.

3 RACIST AND VIOLENT: BOLSONARO’S STANCE ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INDIGENIST POLICY

Bolsonaro is now nationally and internationally known for his frequent racist remarks regarding Brazilian indigenous peoples. Recently, while talking about one of his favorite topics—the legislative proposal to open indigenous lands to mining activities—he affirmed, “Surely, the Indians are changing, they are evolving. They are becoming more and more human like us.”⁹ Behind such a pseudo-“evolutionist” and racist comment is the reiterated idea that indigenous peoples are primitive and should be “integrated” into the “national society.” In 2015, he declared that “Indians do not speak our language, do not have money, they are poor fellows, they must be integrated into society and not kept in millionaire zoos.”¹⁰ A few months later, he affirmed that “we will integrate [indigenous peoples] into society. Like the army, which does a wonderful job integrating them into the armed forces.”¹¹ In sum, “our plan for Indians is to turn them into beings like us. They have the same needs as we do. Indians want doctors, dentists, television, and the internet.”¹²

⁸ <http://armazemmemoria.com.br/tag/relatorio-figueiredo/>.

⁹ <https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2020/01/23/indio-ta-evoluindo-cada-vez-mais-ser-humano-igual-a-nos-diz-bolsonaro.htm> .

¹⁰ <https://www.midiamax.com.br/politica/2015/indio-e-pobre-coitado-e-vive-em-zoologicos-milenarios-diz-bolsonaro>. Accessed on: March 11, 2020.

¹¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zykvBACFzGg>. Accessed on: March 11, 2020.

¹² <https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/afp/2018/12/01/bolsonaro-critica-ibama-e-icmbio.htm>. Accessed on: March 11, 2020.

The Brazilian indigenous land claims policy is a matter of particular criticism by the president. Commenting on his plans for the FUNAI, he said that “if elected, I will be throwing a scythe at the FUNAI’s neck. There is no other way. It does not work anymore.” Still, during his presidential campaign, Bolsonaro said that, if elected, “there will not be one centimeter of demarcated lands for Indigenous or Quilombola communities.”¹³ A couple of months after, during an interview, he corrected himself and said that “not even a millimeter” of traditional lands would be demarcated.¹⁴ Consequently, he also criticized the size of already demarcated lands saying that “this executive policy of unilateral demarcation of indigenous lands will cease to exist and those reserves that I can reduce in size, I will be doing this.”¹⁵ He would go even further and propose that “in 2019 we will be undoing the [indigenous land] Raposa Serra do Sol.”¹⁶

Bolsonaro also frequently comments on opening indigenous land to mining and large-scale farming activities. He considers it a vital move to further increase economic development in the country. In 2015, he declared that “there are no indigenous lands where there are no minerals. Gold, tin, and magnesium are found on those lands, especially in the Amazon, the richest region of the world. I do not go with this bullshit of defending indigenous lands.”¹⁷ Some years later, as president, he affirmed that “if I were king of Roraima [the northernmost Brazilian state], with technology, it would have within twenty years an economy close to that of Japan. Everything is there. However, 60% of it is inviable because of indigenous reserves and other environmental protection areas. We have everything to develop this wonderful region called Amazon.”¹⁸

All those comments were widely publicized and sparked outrage from indigenous peoples and their allies. However, what is less known is that Bolsonaro’s stance on indigenous peoples and indigenist policy can be traced way back to the beginning of his political career. As an eloquent example, consider his speech at the House of Representatives in 1998, when he affirmed, “The Brazilian cavalry was incompetent. The American cavalry was the competent one because it decimated the

13 <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nao-podemos-abrir-as-portas-para-todo-mundo-diz-bolsonaro-em-palestra-na-hebraica,70001725522>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

14 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zykvBACFzGg>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

15 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCXZEdVHHEw>. Accessed on: March 11, 2020.

16 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUgDXVbPHZs>. Accessed on: March 11, 2020. Raposa Serra do Sol is a indigenous land demarcated in 2009 after years of litigation at the Brazilian Supreme Court.

17 <https://www.campograndenews.com.br/politica/bolsonaro-diz-que-oab-so-defende-bandido-e-reserva-indigena-e-um-crime>. Accessed on: March 11, 2020.

18 <https://noticias.uol.com.br/meio-ambiente/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2019/08/06/bolsonaro-ironiza-criticas-sobre-desmatamento-sou-o-capitao-motosserra.htm>. Accessed on: March 11, 2020.

country’s indigenous peoples, and therefore they do not have this problem today.”¹⁹

Despite there having been a violent decimation of indigenous peoples in both countries, Bolsonaro’s complete ignorance on the issue is clear, considering that indigenous people make up 0.47% of the total Brazilian population (IBGE 2010), while in the United States, the indigenous population has been estimated to be more than 1.7% of the total population (National Congress of American Indians 2010²⁰.) Several years before the appraisal of the “efficiency” of the American genocide of its indigenous peoples, Bolsonaro would be the only representative to propose the cancellation of the decree demarcating the Indigenous land of the Yanomami people.²¹

The analysis of such comments shows a consistent pattern of prejudicial remarks regarding Brazilian indigenous peoples and indigenist policy that leaves no room for hope that the president’s behavior will change any time soon. Not surprisingly, Bolsonaro’s government targeted the country’s indigenist policy since day one of his administration. In the following section, we will discuss how the contemporary Brazilian government is proceeding to actively undermine several dimensions of this policy, with particular focus on the freezing of new processes of land demarcation and the dismantling of the top Brazilian agency for indigenous peoples, the FUNAI.

4 DISMANTLING INDIGENIST POLICY: THREE DIMENSIONS OF THE PHENOMENON

Even though Jair Bolsonaro can be accurately described as an “anti-indigenous” politician *avant la lettre*, it must be stressed that the undermining of indigenous rights and policy is a long-term trend in Brazilian politics. Indigenist policy is chronically underfunded, and the FUNAI faces problems keeping its staff above the minimum required to perform its duties. The most significant problem faced by the institutions involved in indigenous issues is its permanent vulnerability to political forces, regardless if channeled by right- or left-wing parties. In sharp contrast to former president Lula da Silva’s (2003–2010) approach, to mention just one example, the progressive distancing of Dilma Rousseff’s government (2011–2016) from the indigenous social movement was followed by an aggressive approximation to representatives of agribusiness and prominent members of the ruralist caucus. Katia Abreu, one of its most outspoken members, became minister of agriculture in 2015 and was a tireless critic of indigenous peoples and their right to traditional lands. In other words, the indigenist policy is

¹⁹ <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/lupa/2018/12/06/verificamos-bolsonaro-cavalaria/>. Accessed on: February 28, 2020.

²⁰ <https://www.ncai.org/about-tribes/demographics> Accessed on: July 09, 2021.

²¹ The Yanomami indigenous land is the largest traditional land in the Brazilian territory.

a complicated political matter in Brazil and should not be analyzed through a rigid ideological lens.

However, no previous government has shown such open hostility toward indigenous peoples, rights, and indigenist policy, or such virulent attacks on some of the core activities of the Brazilian state regarding indigenous peoples.

In theoretical terms, we use the policy-dismantling literature as our guide to understand what we have been calling “attacks” on indigenist policy so far. We assume that the dismantling of a policy is a subcategory of policy change, for example, a concept focused on explaining a change that ultimately terminates the policy under scrutiny. Moreover, we agree with Bauer and Knill’s (2012, 35) definition of policy dismantling as “a change of a direct, indirect, hidden or symbolic nature that either diminishes the number of policies in a particular area, reduces the number of policy instruments used and/or lowers their intensity.”

In this paper, we are particularly interested in shedding light on the effects of policy dismantling on Brazil’s indigenist policy. It relates to actions taken by the Brazilian government to decrease enforcement, administrative and procedural capacities of the institutions, and regulations regarding indigenous issues in the country.

4.1 Dismantling the land claims process and institutions

The first and more harmful measure taken by Bolsonaro’s government is undoubtedly the complete freeze of indigenous land demarcations (up to October 2021).

Following the Indian Statute, the TIs are classified in the following ways: (1) Traditionally Occupied Indigenous Lands; (2) Indigenous Reserves; (3) Domain Lands; and (4) Restricted Areas. Concerning the absolute number and the average number of homologations of these territories in the postdictatorial presidential mandates, the data available is as follows: José Sarney homologated 67 indigenous lands, with an average of 13 per mandate year; Fernando Collor de Mello, 112, with an average of 56; Itamar Franco, 16, with an average of 8; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 145, with an average of 18; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 87, with an average of 10; and Dilma Rousseff, 21, with an average of 3. Michel Temer²² and Bolsonaro did not demarcate any indigenous land. The Instituto Socioambiental (ISA) monitors the process of regularization of indigenous land tenure in Brazil, accounting for a total of 724 of these territories (whether they are in a regularized situation, in the process of

²² <https://www.socioambiental.org/pt-br/noticias-socioambientais/com-pior-desempenho-em-demarcacoes-desde-1985-temer-tem-quatro-terras-indigenas-para-homologar>. Accessed on: August 18, 2020.

regularization, or claimed by indigenous peoples, without any action being taken as of August 2020).²³

The figures presented above could lead us to think that whereas Collor was pro-indigenous, Rouseff was firmly anti-indigenous. The reality, however, is more complex than that. There is no systematic research on the factors that may explain why the number of indigenous lands in Brazil available to date varies over the years. We are currently working on the topic following the pathway opened by the Canadian political scientist Christopher Alcantara, adapting his framework to the Brazilian context (Alcantara 2013). What we have found so far is that the demarcation process is multifactorial and involves elements such as the collective capacity of indigenous groups to present themselves as “credible threats,” proper funding, the bureaucratic capacity of the state apparatus as well as economic aspects that may be very influential, among others (Soares et al., 2021). However, it may be affirmed that the large number of indigenous lands demarcated during certain governments is undoubtedly a reflection of the historical moment in the demarcation process in Brazil and is not related to any governments being more favorable to the demarcation of indigenous lands.

Figures 1 and 2 below show respectively the number of demarcations per year between 1981 and 2019 and the size of the areas demarcated during the period using the FUNAI’s official data.²⁴ It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain the reasons that may explain the two big “cycles of demarcation” in Brazil in 1992 and 1998 and the decreasing number and size of recognized lands over the period. However, some conclusions may be worth drawing from the figures.

First, the overall progression of the demarcations over time can be fairly described as being consistently low, a pattern broken by a few moments where the government is more active than usual. The outlier was the Collor government when Collor demarcated the largest number of *Terras Indígenas* (Indigenous Territories or Indigenous Lands) ever and the biggest ones. Except for the current aberrant period, the Brazilian Indigenous Land Claims Policy has been effective, although inefficient. Now, under Bolsonaro’s administration, it is neither.

²³ Available at: <https://terrasindigenas.org.br/>. Accessed on: August 18, 2020.

²⁴ This data was requested and obtained through the Lei de Acesso à Informação (Information Access Act, in a free translation).




Figure 1 – Number of indigenous lands demarcations in Brazil per year between 1981 and 2019
Source: FUNAI, elaborated by the authors.




Figure 2 – Size of demarcated indigenous lands in Brazil between 1981 and 2019
Source: FUNAI, elaborated by the authors.

The “remilitarization” of the indigenous policy (military staff taking over some of the key posts of the FUNAI instead of civil servants) is also a feature of Bolsonaro’s government. First, it is relevant to consider that indigenous issues were military responsibility since the beginning of the twentieth century, and military personnel was involved in the design of indigenist policies and normative regulations for decades. Second, the militarization of the government is a fact in several policies, and indigenous policy is no exception. There are now over 6,000 military personnel (3,029 still in active duty) performing civilian activities in the administration, the highest number ever, not even found during the civil-military dictatorship (1964–1985).²⁵

The FUNAI structure comprises a headquarter located at the country’s capital, Brasilia, and thirty-nine *coordenações regionais* (CRs, or regional coordination

²⁵ <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/07/17/governo-bolsonaro-tem-6157-militares-em-cargos-civis-diz-tcu.ghtml>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

headquarters). They are designed to deliver the indigenous policy closer to where indigenous peoples live. Each one of them is responsible for attending a certain number of indigenous lands and peoples. Among the regional coordinators (the FUNAI official in charge of running the agency on the ground), twenty were named by the Bolsonaro administration in the last year and a half, and some of them are active military personnel.²⁶ The new president of the agency himself is a member of the Brazilian federal police and replaced a general who had overseen the FUNAI during president Temer’s administration.

4.2 Dismantling the protection of life: the growing violence against indigenous peoples and the COVID-19 pandemic

Talking about violence against indigenous peoples when they are survivors of a historical genocide carried out over centuries by the settler society may sound redundant. The record of contacts between indigenous groups and Brazilian mainstream society was, most of the time, violent and with overarching consequences to their modes of existence. Statistics may vary significantly regarding the exact number of indigenous peoples killed immediately after the first contact or due to the spread of new viruses, and some talk about millions of individuals. However, there is no doubt that indigenous populations experienced a cataclysmic event, which reduced their number to less than one-third of the estimated original figure. Some populations were wiped out entirely, and others were reduced to just a few survivors (Ribeiro, 1979 [1970]).

In recent times, following the 2014 Comissão Nacional da Verdade (National Truth Commission) report on the violation of human rights of indigenous peoples during the military rule, no fewer than 8,350 indigenous peoples were officially recognized as victims of the regime, among them 1,180 Tapayuna, 118 Parakanã, 72 Araweté, 14 Arara, 176 Panará, 2,650 Waimiri-Atroari, 3,500 Cinta-Larga, 192 Xetá, 354 Yanomami, and 85 Xavantes from the *terra indígena* Marãiwatsédé. They were tortured, imprisoned, or killed without trials, removed from their traditional lands, and starved with little or no help from the authorities. Not surprisingly, some international observers of the issue at the time denounced what they perceived as a genocide perpetrated by the Brazilian government against indigenous peoples (Valente 2017).

However, what is new under Bolsonaro’s rule is the growing perception among the public that indigenous peoples are increasingly under threat in their territories. Moreover, there is the widespread perception that the president’s racist remarks are

²⁶ <https://g1.globo.com/politica/blog/matheus-leitao/post/2020/02/04/funai-ja-trocou-comando-de-20-coordenadorias-regionais-maioria-dos-nomeados-e-militar.ghtml>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

a powerful incentive for territorial violations, encroachment, and illegal logging and mining activities within indigenous lands.

Following the tracking of homicides of indigenous peoples in Brazil carried out by the Conselho Indigenista Missionário (CIMI, or Missionary Council for Indigenous Peoples), a missionary organization linked to the Brazilian Catholic Church, there were 135 killings in 2018 (see Figure 3). We can observe a pattern of increasing violence since 2013. As a proxy to this figure, we could mention 2019’s 23% increase of conflicts in the countryside compared with 2018 available data.²⁷ There is no reason to doubt that this trend will continue during the years ahead.




Figure 3 – Number of homicides among indigenous peoples between 2003 and 2018
Source: CIMI 2019, elaborated by the authors.

More recently, there were several killings of indigenous peoples, which brought public attention to the issue. To cite just a few, in July 2019, Emyra Wajãpi, a sixty-nine-year-old indigenous leader, was stabbed to death, and his body was found floating in a lake allegedly after conflicts with illegal miners.²⁸ In November 2019, Paulo Paulino Guajajara was killed with a shot in the face by illegal hunters or loggers while patrolling the boundaries of his traditional land.²⁹ In sum, violence against indigenous peoples has been increasing and stimulated by presidential rhetoric.

²⁷ The number of conflicts on the countryside was calculated by the Comissão Pastoral da Terra, another religious organization linked to the Catholic Church. Available at: <https://www.cptnacional.org.br/publicacoes-2/destaque/5167-conflitos-no-campo-brasil-2019>. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

²⁸ <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lider-indigena-e-morto-a-facada-no-amapa-politicos-veem-acao-de-garimpeiros,70002942614>. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

²⁹ https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/11/02/politica/1572726281_632337.html. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

Finally, the pressure over indigenous peoples in Brazil increased enormously with the COVID-19 pandemic. It is clear so far that they have been suffering attacks and threats from all sides under Bolsonaro’s government. The arrival of the new coronavirus brought back the fears of the first years of contact when there were massive extinctions of entire peoples through a contamination with unknown diseases brought by colonizers.

Since the beginning of the pandemic, President Bolsonaro has regularly dismissed the new coronavirus as just a “flu” or a “cold” and something that Brazilians should not be worried about at all.³⁰ Moreover, his administration has been actively undermining governors and mayors who have wanted to take measures to stop the spread of the virus. In an unprecedented move, in June 2020, the Ministry of Health decided not to publish consolidated data regarding COVID-19, a measure later reverted by a judicial injunction by the Supreme Court.³¹

In light of the despicable actions of the Brazilian government against indigenous peoples, the most important indigenous “peak organization” of the country—the Articulação dos Povos Indígenas do Brasil (APIB, or Articulation of the Indigenous Peoples of Brazil)—in partnership with the Instituto Socioambiental decided to take the matter into their hands. They built up a system of tracking the cases of infection among indigenous peoples, communities, and lands.³² By May 3, 2021, there were 53,329 confirmed cases, 1,060 dead, and 163 indigenous peoples affected. By October 8, 2021, this number had increased to 59,802 confirmed cases and 1,210 deaths., which does not include many indigenous people who live outside TIs. Aftyer Amazonas state, the Mato Grosso region is the most affected one, with 4,349 confirmed cases so far. Even before such a grim scenario, the Brazilian government reduced by 9% the money spent by the Secretaria Especial de Saúde Indígena (SESAI, or Special Secretary of Indigenous Health) in the first half of 2020 compared with the same period in 2019.³³ Not surprisingly, an increasing number of political actors raised concerns over what they perceive as a genocide caused by the inaction of Bolsonaro’s administration.³⁴

30 <https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/bolsonaro-volta-minimizar-pandemia-chama-covid-19-de-gripezinha-1-24319177>. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

31 <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/06/09/ministerio-da-saude-volta-a-divulgar-no-site-oficial-dados-acumulados-da-covid-19.ghtml>. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

32 <https://covid19.socioambiental.org/>. Accessed on: May 3, 2021.

33 https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/mesmo-com-coronavirus-gastos-com-saude-indigena-cairam-9-no-primeiro-semester-1-24593478?versao=amp&__twitter_impression=true. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

34 There is a heated debate over this topic in the country. Indigenous peoples, their organizations, and their allies have no doubt that they are facing a genocidal process. Even one of the most controversial judges of the Brazilian Supreme Court, Gilmar Mendes, affirmed that the military personnel acting in the civil administration were “associates to an ongoing genocide” of the indigenous peoples, a comment that sparked outrage by them. Cf: <https://noticias.uol.com.br/saude/ultimas-noticias/redacao/2020/07/11/gilmar-mendes-exercito-esta-se-associando-a-genocidio-na-pandemia.htm>. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

A terrifying effect of the pandemic among indigenous peoples is the deaths of elders and experienced leaders. Only in the last year, to mention just a few famous cases, such as Paulinho Paiakan, one of the most prominent Kayapó leaders during the 1988 constitutional assembly;³⁵ Nelson Rikbaktsa, an increasing charismatic young leadership in the northwestern part of Mato Grosso;³⁶ and Aritana Yawalapiti, one of the most prominent leaders of the Xingu region over the last fifty years who was considered one of the greatest Brazilian indigenous leaders.³⁷ Indigenous elders are valued in their communities because they are “living libraries” of their peoples, frequently being the ones who still speak their mother tongues and keep the traditions alive. Yet, they are much more than that since they are political and spiritual guides who can keep group cohesion and identity. Every loss is incalculable.

Unfortunately, the recklessness of the Brazilian government in dealing with the pandemic has cost the lives of more than five hundred and thirty thousand Brazilians so far (up to July 09, 2021), including 1,130 indigenous persons³⁸. Again, there is no clear sign that this horrific trend will stop anytime soon, and indigenous peoples seem to be at grave risk of genocide.

4.3 Dismantling the integrity of the traditional territories: mining and large-scale farming within indigenous lands

Another ongoing violence against indigenous peoples in contemporary Brazil is the increasing number of attempts to pass legislation opening traditional lands to economic activities such as large-scale farming and mining. Historically, Brazilian politics has been dominated by political actors who are part of the agrarian elite that has ruled the country since the Portuguese colonial period (Barcelos and Berriel 2009). Costa (2012) analyzed the land ownership of 374 members of the “ruralist” caucus—officially named Frente Parlamentar da Agropecuária³⁹ (FPA)—in Brazilian parliament between 1995 and 2010 and concluded that this heterogeneous group has been successful in buying its agenda, renegotiating debts, and maintaining a high

³⁵ <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/2020/06/morre-lideranca-caiapo-paulinho-paiakan-viti-ma-da-covid-19.shtml>. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

³⁶ <https://cimi.org.br/2020/07/nota-de-solidariedade-myky-ao-povo-rikbaktsa/>. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

³⁷ <https://www.correiobraziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2020/08/05/interna-brasil,878682/morre-de-covid-cacique-aritana-yawalapiti-ativista-de-direitos-indige.shtml>. Accessed on: August 19, 2020.

³⁸ <https://emergenciaindigena.apiboficial.org/> Accessed on July 09, 2021.

³⁹ The FPA’s agenda contains debates and legislative proposals related to environmental legislation, the labor conditions of rural workers, insurance, credit expansion, and debt renegotiation, among other issues.

level of investment in agribusiness. Moreover, ruralists have spread their influence by controlling broadcasts, urban industries, and land, and becoming one of the most powerful interest groups within the Brazilian parliament.

A crucial element of the discussion of indigenous rights in general, and land claims in particular, is the economic dimension. Indigenous peoples worldwide claim to be the owners of a great deal of the world’s territory and vast portions of land in countries such as Brazil. Furthermore, indigenous peoples claim rights to exclusive use—or prohibition of use—of the natural resources in such lands. It is not unusual that native groups chose to adopt sustainable and low-impact economic activities rather than large-scale predatory ones, considering the record of human rights violations and the disruptions of community life that occur when governments permit the exploitation of minerals or cattle grazing on indigenous lands.⁴⁰

Figure 4 below shows the variation of the number of representatives members of the ruralist caucus in the House of Representatives between 1995 and 2019.




Figure 4 – Representatives affiliated with the ruralist caucus in Brazilian parliament—legislatures between 1995 and 2019

Source: DIAP 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2019 and elaborated by the author.

The representatives of the ruralist caucus influence indigenous policy in multiple ways, such as publicly criticizing any governmental initiative aimed at confirming indigenous rights, appointing ruralist members to high- and middle-level positions in ministries and secretaries related to indigenist policy, proposing legislation that changes

⁴⁰ Several examples are available of human rights violation caused by the exploitation of natural resources within indigenous lands. In 1989, the Brazilian government allowed the exploitation of gold mines within the Yanomami territory; this decision led to the deaths of hundreds of peoples due to infectious diseases and intoxication (Ramos 2000). More recently, McNeish (2015) illustrated the consequences of the Bolivian government’s plans to build a road through Isiboro Sécur National Park and Indigenous Territory.

constitutional parameters, or simply blocking any legislative proposal informed by indigenous peoples and their allies. As Figure 4 illustrates, during her first and second terms, President Dilma Rousseff had to address an impressive number of congressional representatives with strong views regarding indigenous rights. President Jair Bolsonaro, in turn, will have to deal with only 104 of such representatives, the lowest number since the 2003 legislature. This figure could supposedly be interpreted *prima facie* as a loss of influence in the legislative branch. In that case, nothing could be further from reality, as he recently declared to the ruralist caucus that “this government is yours!”⁴¹ As a corollary of this “golden age” of the ruralist influence among state business, it is the fact that Bolsonaro’s minister of agriculture, Tereza Cristina, is considered by many to be the favorite running mate in an eventual reelection presidential ticket for 2022.⁴²

There are several legislative proposals in both chambers of congress regarding economic activities and indigenist policy. One of the most threatening one is the legislative Proposal for Constitutional Amendment No. 215/2000, which the ruralist caucus has been trying to pass over the last twenty years, unsuccessfully thus far (Soares 2017). Briefly, the proposal aims to strip the FUNAI’s constitutional mission to demarcate lands and move it to the parliament. Moreover, nine proposed decrees in the lower chamber ask for the suspension of already demarcated indigenous lands; another six legislative initiatives target indigenist policies.⁴³ The Bill 490 (Projeto de Lei, PL 490/2007) transfers the responsibility for demarcating indigenous lands to the Legislature, allowing areas that have been officially recognized for decades to be removed from indigenous peoples’ possession. It also foresees that the territories will be exposed to illegal mining and the construction of roads and large hydroelectric plants.

Landowners’ and mining companies’ interests are in tension, if not direct opposition, with indigenous views regarding the use of land resources. Presumably, representatives in line with such interests may favor policy changes that benefit landowners/governments or block any changes that will negatively impact their interests. In this sense, such interests may be politically influential and act as powerful veto players.

41 <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,bolsonaro-a-bancada-ruralista-esse-governo-e-de-voces,70002904662>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

42 <https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/republica/casamento-ideologico-bancada-ruralista-vive-era-de-ouro-com-bolsonaro/>; <https://www.canalrural.com.br/programas/informacao/rural-noticias/alexandre-garcia-tereza-cristina-pode-ser-a-vice-de-bolsonaro-em-2022/>. Accessed on August 21, 2020.

43 http://www.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-tematica/ccr6/documentos-e-publicacoes/acompanhamento-de-tramitacao-de-propostas-legislativas/documentos/acompanhamento-legislativo_1-k.pdf. Accessed on: June 20, 2020.

5 RESISTING THE DISMANTLING: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIES OF THE BRAZILIAN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT

Despite the challenges faced by Brazilian indigenous peoples briefly outlined above, they have been increasing their collective capacity to organize and advance their agenda in multiple political arenas over the last thirty years. In a recent interview, a prominent Brazilian indigenous leader, Ailton Krenak, while talking about the perspectives of attacks on indigenous rights by then-presidential candidate Jair Bolsonaro, declared: “We went through so many offenses that one more will not get us crazy. I worry, though, if white people will resist. We have been resisting for 500 years”⁴⁴ (translated from the Portuguese by the authors). Krenak’s prudential but confident statement is corroborated by empirical evidence that indigenous peoples are sophisticated in their political strategies.

Firstly, we consider indigenous acts of protest in contemporary Brazil. Following the data we gathered in 2017 (see Figure 5) (Soares 2017), the Brazilian Indigenous Movement carried out 286 actions between 2009 and 2016. An increase in activism began in 2010 that reached its peak in 2011 and fell dramatically after 2012. Forty-four actions took place in 2009, 43 took place in 2010, and 82 took place in 2011, the highest number of the period. Thirty-four activities took place in 2012, 35 in 2013, 19 in 2014, and 26 in 2015. As of March 2016, only 3 actions of protest had taken place.




Figure 5 – Number of protests by the Brazilian Indigenous Movement between 2009 and 2016

Source: Soares 2017.

⁴⁴ <https://expresso.pt/internacional/2018-10-19-Somos-indios-resistimos-ha-500-anos.-Fico-preocupado-e-se-os-brancos-vaio-resistir>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

The possible reasons that may explain why there is an actual decrease in indigenous protests during the period analyzed were explored elsewhere (Soares 2019). More important, in our judgment, however, are the types of protest used by the indigenous movement. The data revealed that most actions carried out by the Brazilian Indigenous Movement during the period considered were related to media and digital activism and symbolic acts. This finding means that even though contentious acts attract more media attention, they are only a tiny fraction of the movement’s actions. The daily work of indigenous organizations is based on information sharing and network building through the internet. Lastly, various symbolic acts are also an essential part of the indigenous movement’s repertory of action. Figure 6 presents the numbers related to each type of action between 2009 and 2016.




Figure 6 – Frequency of actions of the Brazilian Indigenous Movement by category between 2009 and 2016.
Source: Soares 2017

Secondly, indigenous peoples are increasingly fighting their struggles in courts. The judicialization of indigenous policy and politics in Brazil still needs to be investigated further. However, some recent events may signalize that they are more prone to using the “litigation strategy” to push their political agenda forward. As examples, we could mention the first-ever oral presentation at the Brazilian Supreme Court by an indigenous lawyer, Joênia Wapichana, during the trial of the *Terra Indígena*

Raposa Serra do Sol in 2008⁴⁵; and the successful oral presentation at the Supreme Court by Luiz Eloy Terena, another indigenous lawyer, who was able to support the APIB’s bid for the guaranteeing of the government assistance to indigenous peoples during the COVID-19 pandemic,⁴⁶ contesting the government’s deliberate lack of action.

Finally, it is also worth pointing out the mobilization of transnational networks of support as an effective political strategy carried out by Brazilian indigenous peoples and their leaders. The latest example of this process is the international campaign *Sangue Indígena: nenhuma gota a mais!* (“Indigenous Blood: not a single drop more”), when eight prominent indigenous leaders toured through eighteen cities in twelve European countries, denouncing the threats to their rights to an international audience and world leaders.⁴⁷ The meetings between the great Kayapó leader Ropni (Raoni) Metuktire with Emmanuel Macron, the president of France, and representatives of the British Parliament⁴⁸ also stand out. In sum, Brazilian indigenous peoples, who once had immense bureaucratic obstacles to leaving the country during the military rule,⁴⁹ are now actively traveling globally and networking with other indigenous peoples and organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and governments.

CONCLUSION

The Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro came to power with strong racist views on indigenous peoples’ politics and indigenist policy. Our paper discussed three distinct but intertwined processes that, as we have shown, are at the core of the renewed attacks against the first inhabitants of the Pindorama. Ultimately, they all are part of the broader goal of Bolsonaro’s administration to strip indigenous peoples of their rights enshrined in the constitution and dismantle the post-1988 indigenist policy.

We pointed out that the dismantling of the indigenist policy under Bolsonaro’s rule comprises (1) the complete freeze of land demarcation and the remilitarization of the institutions in charge of indigenous issues; (2) the increasing violence against indigenous communities and the spreading of COVID-19 among indigenous

45 <http://www.stf.jus.br/PORTAL/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=95042>. Accessed on August 21, 2020. Joênia Wapixana was elected as representative for the federal chamber in 2018, the second indigenous (and the first indigenous woman) to be ever elected to the legislative branch in Brazilian history.

46 https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/politica/2020/08/08/interna_politica,1174379/eloy-terena-o-advogado-que-marcou-o-direito-indigena.shtml. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

47 <https://en.nenhumagotamais.org/>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

48 <https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2019/05/17/macron-recebe-raoni-e-assegura-apoio-da-franca.ghtml>; <http://institutoraoni.org.br/raoni-e-megaron-vao-ao-parlamento-britanico/>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

49 <https://pib.socioambiental.org/pt/Not%C3%ADcias?id=202910>. Accessed on: August 21, 2020.

communities and the critical failure of the Brazilian government to tackle the problem; and (3) the reiterated attempts to open indigenous lands to large-scale farming and mining activities.

On the other hand, as we have seen, Brazilian indigenous peoples are now exceptionally equipped to face the above-mentioned political processes’ challenges. We highlighted three strategies: (1) the growing use of media and digital means as a way of protesting; (2) the increasing use of the Supreme Court as an institutional locus where political struggles occur; and (3) the mobilization of transnational networks of support and denouncing. The recent “denouncing tour” carried out by prominent indigenous leaders through several European countries proves that indigenous organizations can mobilize a strong network of international allies to bring attention to their cause. At the same time, there is a growing sense that the risks to their very existence are rising at the domestic level. There is no sign that this tendency will retract any time soon.

Indigenous peoples have been facing threats to their existence since the beginning of colonization. Brazilian indigenous peoples were enslaved and had their lands taken by settlers and colonial and imperial administrations and were on the verge of extinction in the early twentieth century (Ribeiro, 1979 [1970]). As phoenix reborn from the ashes, they were able to organize and mobilize themselves collectively and achieved significant political goals such as the constitutionalizing of their rights and recognizing their traditional lands by the Brazilian state.

As long as social science has a limited power to change the status quo, it is not useless. In an empirically oriented fashion, our paper may be helpful to show that the convergence of such lines of political action carried out by Bolsonaro’s government can amount to an ever-growing genocide of Brazilian indigenous peoples that is happening right now under international eyes. We hope that our work may help spread the critical situation that indigenous peoples are going through in contemporary Brazil.

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