

DOI: 10.30612/rmufgd.v11i21.16529

The Global South and its Perspectives: Expanding the Frontiers of International Relations

Fernanda Barth Barasuol

Visiting Professor at the Federal University of Grande Dourados (UFGD)
Dourados, MS (Brazil)

E-mail: febarasuol@gmail.com

Orcid: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2368-8226>

Luiza Cerioli

Post-doctoral Researcher at the University of Kassel
Kassel, HE (Germany)

E-mail: luizacerioli@gmail.com

Orcid: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3650-8378>

Mariana Kalil

Assistant Professor at the Brazilian War College (ESG)
Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

E-mail: mariana.kalil@esg.br

Orcid: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1302-8339>

INTRODUCTION

Most of those working critically with International Relations (IR) theory in the so-called Global South agree on one point: the discipline's core is Westernized, which hampers IR's ability to explain phenomena in many parts of the world. Moreover, almost like a ritual, most articles written on this critique begin with Hoffman's (1977) famous statement that IR is an "American Social Science" (AYOUB, 2002; BILGIN, 2008; DECIANCIO, 2016, GELARDI 2020). That means the discipline has been made mainly *by* and *for* those seated in the top decision-making positions in wealthy Western countries – particularly the United States – and is force-fed to the world periphery who constantly consume content without having their content consumed (TICKNER; WEAVER, 2009). This critique has correctly stressed a unidirectionality: IR tends to be produced in the center and projected to other world regions, while what is made outside the Western/European center seldom travels outside national (or at most regional) borders (ALEJANDRO, 2019). Equally important, what is produced in this so-called Global North is masked as universal, as if its concepts, arguments, theories and conclusions need not adapt to different contexts (ACHARYA, 2014).¹

In this article, we – together with the special edition's other authors – start from the principle that this critique is decisively consolidated. Today, it is possible to say we are reaching a consensus within IR scholarship: yes, the discipline has a clear Western-centric or Global North origin and tendency. Opinions diverge on whether that is good, bad, or unimportant. Indeed, at least a part of the mainstream still treats the issue as unimportant, says Hoffman was mostly mistaken (TURTON 2016) or contends that this hierarchy is changing due to the growing number of publications from outside the knowledge-producing center (KRISTENSEN, 2013). Nevertheless, we argue that de-Westernizing IR is an essential step forward within the discipline that brings greater inclusion and diversity of experiences. While an increasing number of publications and conference participation from non-Western scholars is commendable (KRISTENSEN, 2013), this discussion does not end with quantitative improvements only. This division of labor among scholars – which mainly reproduces long-standing economic inequalities – relates to issues of the sociology of knowledge as well as material and access problems and needs to be further addressed (TICKNER; WEAVER, 2009).

1 While we understand the terms "non-West" and "Global South" have different origins and might have different connotations, here we use them interchangeably to mean those countries that suffer from colonial/imperialistic legacies or have historically occupied marginalized spaces within the international capitalism as well as in the international circulation of ideas.

Therefore, stating that IR needs to de-Westernize is not something new, and, as we and most texts in this edition show, many different pathways have appeared as alternatives to proceed in this endeavor. We discuss these pathways briefly in the following section. Afterward, we narrow our lenses toward Global IR (GIR), an initiative or movement first proposed by Amitav Acharya in 2014, which has received more and more attention and acceptance since then. We present the main ideas of Global IR to discuss why this initiative to pluralize the discipline via reformism and subsumption is valuable. We also show the current limitations of Global IR, which is mainly centered on who is actually producing “GIR content” and who has access to it. That brings us to our main argument: the often overlooked issue of material conditions to deliver innovative science and how it can hamper even the most well-intended attempt to de-Westernize a discipline. We finalize using the Brazilian case to show how economic and political issues are linked to the flourishing or decay of a national scholarship.

In addition to presenting our argument, this text introduces this special issue, its nine original research articles and the interview with Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner (City University of New York). However, instead of presenting small summaries of each text, we interweave their arguments into those presented in our article organically. That allows us to showcase their particular contributions and how they fit in and add to the broader debate of Global IR.

THE MANY PATHWAYS TO PLURALIZING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As Hoffman (1977) put it, and Biersteker (2009) reconfirmed decades later, US IR scholarship is indeed globally hegemonic, as the majority of most cited academics, journals, associations, conferences, schools and publishers are based in the United States. We disproportionately read authors from the United States, independently from our chosen theoretical or methodological approach. Moreover, most introduction to IR and IR Theory (IRT) courses will turn our attention to US-based names such as John Mearsheimer, Kenneth N. Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. One key characteristic of this mainstream US IR scholarship (trapped in the neoliberalism vs. neorealism debate) is an ambition toward parsimony and universalism. The idea is that if the international system is composed of the same units (states) seeking the main objective (survival), what happens in one place happens everywhere.

This parochialism is, indeed, a central disciplinary problem that the critiques stress. It is parochial to think that the countries within the periphery of the international system will be conditioned or prioritize the same interests, threats and values when doing foreign policy as in

the Global North. However, as Biersteker (2009, p. 308) correctly put it, all national IR scholarly communities are, in one way or another, parochial. That means they reach conclusions based on the limited experiences and contexts in which they were made while forgetting, during the process, that these limitations are there in the first place. Hence, what we propose here as de-Westernizing IR means bringing to the disciplinary mainstream other national communities, increasing diversity and plurality, not replacing one parochialism for another.

It is important to stress that US IR parochialism can be linked with the behaviorist wave in the 1980s that pushed the Social Sciences toward rationalist epistemologies and methodologies (HALLIDAY, 1994). As these scholars were predominantly interested in solving US foreign policy issues, the behaviorist turn led to distancing the discipline from Area Studies specialists who produced in-depth analyses about the specificities of world regions (VALBJORN, 2004). That is because Area Studies, itself a colonial invention to the benefit of imperialist powers, does not produce the type of knowledge that could evolve into positivist and universalizing laws. Then, an artificial division of labor emerged: IR (which in the US is viewed as part of Political Science) became a problem-solving discipline producing generalizations, while Area Studies made detailed, practical, culturalistic, and contextual work on non-core regions (SHAMI; MILLER-IDRISS 2016). In other words, area specialists should cover the uncouth and exotic regions, whereas IR scholars should produce universal science based on those in the center (BILGIN, 2015).

This way, the IR that must be de-Westernized emerged as a function of great power competition and their foreign policy priorities while infused by the politics of race, nationalism, wars, and imperialism (BUZAN; ACHARYA, 2019). Therefore, the urge to maintain US political domination relegated a significant part of the world to a peripheral position in disciplinary knowledge production (BUZAN; LAWSON 2015). The US parochialism that is so often stressed in this special edition is the product of universalist theories and concepts reflecting the US experience that ignore or silence the history and agency of the Global South (FAWCETT, 2020).

Within this special edition, the articles from Ana Paula Silva, Guilherme Macedo and Ellen Monielle (*Wandering Through Trodden Paths?: A Pluriversal Perspective on the Latin American Indigenous Diplomacy*), Juliane Teixeira (*Problematizing International Relations: Proposals from the Global South for the pluralization of criticism in the discipline*), and Rafael Bittencourt and Valéria Lopes (*A Different IR Already Exists: Exploring Absences and Emergencies from the Global South*) discuss further this issue of silencing and neglecting the IR knowledge produced in the Global South. They stress that what we see today is a disconnection between dominant disciplinary concepts and the realities that non-Western scholars perceive and analyze.

As already mentioned, authors from different backgrounds and approaches have criticized the parochialism of mainstream IR: from post-positivism to post-structuralism, ranging from those linking the problem to broader sociology of science issue to those imposing skeptical historiographic inquiries concerning the discipline's origin (TICKNER; WEAVER 2009). For example, post-colonial authors offer different historical accounts of the "rise of the West" as a counterpoint of the "non-Western" world. Many challenge the benign narrative of universalizing the Western societal-political model throughout the formation of an "international society," stressing how the Global North has, in fact, been profiting and stimulating inequality and unevenness globally (HURRELL, 2016; VUCETIC, 2011). Following this line, Thiago Babo and Daniel Rei Coronato's article *The Concept of State and the Traditional Canon of International Relations: Theoretical-Conceptual Problematization and Critique* argue in this issue for a review of the different processes of state formation in the Global South and their effect on IR.

These evolving academic critical trends bring to the upfront how structures of knowledge production are a reflection and tool for reinforcing power politics, agency segregation, and hierarchies within the international system. This way, de-Westernizing IR must force the scholarship in the Global North to face its own role concerning race, gender, power, and access inequalities (ANIEVAS; MANCHANDA; SHILLIAM, 2015). For instance, Marina Almeida Rosa stresses in her article, *The Influence of the Pan-African Movement for the International Protection of Refugees*, how a Eurocentric understanding of migration did not reflect the reality in Africa, pushing pan-Africanism ideas to the core of law-making in the continent. Both Babo and Coronato and Rosa help to illustrate that the link between knowledge and power is a two-way street: power structures define and constrain which knowledge is produced and accepted while being reinforced by it. However, they also claim that knowledge can confront these power structures when coming from the production's periphery.

Moreover, many IR scholars concentrate on a specific world region, blurring the lines between the discipline and Area Studies. Thus, some argue that the path forward to de-Westernization is bringing area back in (BUZAN; ACHARYA, 2019; HURRELL, 2020). This interdisciplinarity call contends that IR should abandon some parsimony to be able to detect how different world regions react differently to systemic stimuli due to their particularities. This way, Area Studies become geographically bounded intellectual spaces where scholars from different backgrounds seek cases, concepts, and voices, exploring and expanding their knowledge boundaries. Therefore, working in the interface of IR and Area Studies would be an efficient way towards de-Westernization as it combines the first's cross-cutting theories with the second's plentiful contextual analysis (FAWCETT, 2020).

The idea here is to bring regions - and their experiences - while not falling into the culturalistic traps of which Area Studies often are victims. If we are here defending the continuity of IR as a cohesive discipline - with many divergences, schools or paradigms as needed - we cannot support its dismantling into excessive regionalism (HURRELL, 2016). The disciplinary goal must still be to develop concepts, theories and frameworks with a certain degree of general application. What this degree is will not be answered in this special edition conclusively - we think that defining a threshold on what is accepted or rejected is not necessarily productive. Again, while we seek plurality, we must be aware not to substitute one parochialism for another.

In other words, we agree here with Chakrabarty (2000) that most mainstream theoretical and analytical categories are still very relevant, despite being inadequate to all world regions. Indeed, Global South scholars continue to employ many concepts and frameworks developed in the discipline's core, even if, most of the time, adapting them to their countries' realities. Taking Latin America as an example, the two most employed ideas (in IR) produced in the region are the dependency school (CARDOSO; FALETTO, 1969) and Peripheral Realism (ESCUDE, 1992). While the first feeds from ideas of unequal interdependence between different regions similar to Immanuel Wallerstein's World Theory, the second brings discussions of the international division of labor and unequal development to the very Westernized canon of Realism. Alice Castelani's article *Mimicry and ambivalence in the concept of sovereignty: a Brazilian contribution to the discipline of International Relations* focuses on the function of mimicry and ambivalence in the conceptualization process of Brazilian IR to further this discussion of adoption and adequation.

In a nutshell, we live in an extremely complex international system in which the balance of power between countries is clearly shifting, and there is an emergence of new actors and experiences of transnationalism. In practical terms, we cannot escape from the Western mainstream (HURRELL, 2016), but we can adapt and reform it from within. The emergence of schools "beyond the West," mainly the Chinese and the Indian ones, are reminders that the discipline transforms into new realities and power rebalancing (ACHARYA, 2011). Bilgin (2008) brings up the idea of an "academic world market" in which ideas and approaches travel, adapt, and adjust to explain local realities. Aris (2020) goes further to say that a discipline's progress should be measured, among other issues, by its capacity to produce tradable goods and influence other fields, contesting and transforming disciplinary power relations and knowledge production's boundaries. That is, in our view, precisely what Global IR proposes.

We understand Global IR as a movement, an initiative that maps the study of IR globally, detecting and examining how it varies in different parts of the world. It instigates us to

seek better tools to grasp the global order and make inquiries that reflect the world's intricate power diffusion and many social-economic and political changes. Hence, arguing for a Global IR, for many authors, including ourselves, has meant arguing for a broader view: the broadening of our understanding of valid knowledge, which would allow us to learn from policy-makers (ACHARYA; BUZAN, 2009), from indigenous perspectives (QUEJERAZU; TICKNER, 2022), from traditional concepts such as African ubuntu (SMITH, 2012), and more. At the same time, broadening our conception of 'IR' would allow us to encompass race, gender, and other issues and agendas that have been historically marginalized in the discipline - as well as the authors who have tried to understand them (VITALIS, 2015).

It is worth noting that these calls for broadening the discipline have not come exclusively from Global IR. Indeed, one could argue that GIR has followed a larger movement of questioning of the disciplinary canon often referred to as the "Third Debate." This umbrella term encompasses such varying critiques as post-modernism and post-structuralism, feminism, and post-colonialism. Despite the general eclecticism of this Debate, many of these perspectives have in common "an emphasis on the constructed nature of knowledge" and a "claim that language plays a central role in the construction of reality" (BALZACQ; BEALE, 2017, n.p.). That is the case of post-colonialism, a theoretical tradition dating back to the 1970s that has been slowly gaining ground in IR.

Postcolonialism might be the first tradition in IR to bring attention to marginalized voices from the Global South, as well as to "the intersections of race, class, and gender in the construction of power asymmetries" (CHOWDRY; NAIR, 2002, p. 2) both within and between states, and the role colonialism has played in building and perpetuating those asymmetries. Following Said (2007 [1978]), postcolonial analyses focus on the way the identities of the West and the non-West have been constructed in opposition to each other through discourse as "Self" and "Other" and how the markers ascribed to each - such as civilized/uncivilized - have broad consequences. While post-colonialism, then, is a precursor in challenging the "epistemic, ideological, and political authority of Western and elite knowledge" (CHOWDRY; NAIR, 2002, p. 13), some (primarily Marxist) authors have questioned its focus on culture in detriment of material conditions - a point we further discuss using the Brazilian case in the last section of this paper.²

² It is worth stressing that these critiques are aimed chiefly at what Ballestrin (2017) refers to as "canonical post-colonialism" of authors such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha.

As already mentioned, while it is crucial to understand how different actors ascribe meaning to their actions concerning their culture, history, and politics, one must be suspicious of culturalist accounts. In IR, it is the politics of culture that one must be concerned about, not the culture itself (HURRELL, 2020). If not, excessive relativism can maintain what is produced in the non-Western world restricted to its borders and ignore that many of the similitudes within countries are products of systemic factors (BUZAN, 2016; GELARDI, 2019). Limiting non-Western IR to macro units of analysis (such as the Islamic World, the Chinese values, or the Latin-American governance style) can be counterproductive for Global IR because it ignores the interconnectivity between such units. When culture is presented as the single cause of a political phenomenon or event, the concepts and ideas developed for that analysis cannot be applied in any other case and, therefore, do not contribute to de-Westernizing IR.

To wrap up our introduction of Global IR's main ideas, it is critical to stress that, despite its broadness, the initiative agrees with authors who argue that most traditional IR conventions are inefficient but necessary. Notions such as security dilemma, anarchy, and power balance, developed by Western academia, can be pertinent worldwide. Therefore, what is needed is a recalibration of the *International* in IR, connecting the various scholarly communities and their different understandings (HELLMAN; VALBJORN, 2017). This way, Global IR suggests advancing the discipline by inclusion and reimagination, embracing and promoting academic power diffusion. That can only be done if we face that the links between those controlling power structures and those producing knowledge are stronger than one may accept - in other words, if we understand the Global IR initiative as part of a bigger discussion on the sociology of knowledge.

POWER STRUCTURES AND PRODUCING IR

As mentioned before, Global IR does not appear in a scientific vacuum, and there are similar enterprises in other fields. In History, for instance, the Global History agenda is quite similar to Global IR, highlighting how the unequal global division of power among societies is reflected in which History we are learning in our schools and universities. That brings us to a notion that can sound inconvenient for those who have convictions in the secularity of science or those who believe in the absolute separation between science and society. Both Global IR and Global History can turn the spotlight of the de-Westernizing to the geographic lines of the so-called epistemic universalism. Given the Global North-South divide in the distribution of intellectual labor, it is only fitting to raise the thesis that material conditions must have at

least some influence on the ability to produce knowledge, while economic, as well as political contexts must have a decisive impact in such an endeavor.

Besides dealing with the social structures and processes of scientific activities, the sociology of knowledge grapples with the social conditions of science, something some call the macro-political sphere (BEN-DAVID; SULLIVAN, 1975). It exposes that those who trust in the secularity of science overlook the impact macro-political conditions have on science. Even though Tickner and Weaver (2009) introduce the idea of geocultural epistemologies by underscoring the impact of material conditions in research – both in its content and in the ability to develop an agenda – others still believe the macro-political environment “will be only indirectly influential insofar as they affect the institutional and material bases of intellectual life” (KRISTENSEN, 2015, p. 62).

Peter Markus Kristensen (2013) revisited the idea of IR being a US-driven discipline and provided comprehensive data showing the evolution of the geographical distribution of IR research articles in the Web of Science (WoS) from 1966 to 2011. During the analyzed period, US-based scholars went from roughly 60% to 30% of all articles published - indicating how the discipline slowly transforms as the world becomes more multipolar. However, scholars who bit this chunk are based on what he dubs the Anglo-World, Continental Europe, and the JIT (Japan, Israel, Taiwan) - nothing we would define as the core of the Global South. Moreover, when Kristensen focuses on the leading IR journals, in the same time-frame, not only do publications get even more concentrated in the US (falling from roughly 75% in 1966 to odd-50% in 2011), but gains are significantly more concentrated in the Anglo-World, in Continental Europe, and in Israel.

Not surprisingly, when we cross-compare this analysis with geopolitical divisions, we tend to find the same countries aligned to the so-called Western front. Thus, it is possible to argue that IR is surely Western and that authors based in countries geopolitically relevant to the West tend to gain more space in the WoS publications. That is certainly the case in Kristensen’s sample when we unpack the numbers for Brazil, India, and China:

The growing IR communities in Brazil, India, and China (“BIC”) play a marginal role in mainstream journals. The “BIC” group accounts for 3.2% in recent years, up from less than 1% before the mid-1990s. China is the main driver with an increase from 0.3 to 0.4% in the 1980s and 1990s to around 2.5% of total publications in recent years (KRISTENSEN, 2013, p. 14).

Risse et al. (2022) substantiate this thesis further. After examining citation patterns in the WoS publications and non-WoS publications from Europe, North America, Latin America,

Africa, and Asia, they realized that “while IR theory is referred to everywhere, it is definitely not global” (RISSE et al, 2022, p. 22):

Our top-300 WoS-cited sources have been exclusively published in the United States, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe. Highly cited theory sources in our dataset of non-WoS journals do not contain references to Latin American, African, or Asian scholarship (with the possible exception of China) (Idem).

Even though Hoffmann (1977) argues that democracy is the cornerstone of science in IR and that this is the main reason the discipline is an “American Social Science,” Brazil and India, two emerging countries yet non-threatening to the West, were having a hard time competing with the rise of China-based scholars among international publications (WoS and non-WoS). Given the geopolitical overlap between Western authorship and Western military alliances, it is probable the geopolitical interest in China might have given the Chinese IR some leeway concerning publications. Again, this reflects the upper-mentioned discussion that the discipline moves accordingly to changes in the global power structures - and, when it comes to a possible systemic change, China is by far still leading the debate rather than Brazil or India.

In light of these figures, we cast doubt on Kristensen’s (2015) premise that the macro-political sphere is only indirectly influential in IR. In the discipline, macro-political elements do influence who gets to participate in the debate, as real-life concerns and power competition influence scientific gatekeepers. In fact, one could easily argue that IR is a field with a primacy of practice, a feature that is not only distinctive to Latin American IR, as Tickner (2008) presumed, but to the whole discipline. Not only in Latin America but also the whole of Western IR, the

conceptual and thematic preferences in the field have been molded by a number of political, economic, and social factors, among them domestic state interests and needs, foreign policy practices, developments within the local social sciences, and diverse forms of interaction with the United States (TICKNER, 2008, p. 745).

As Kristensen’s figures show, macro-political contexts are a key underlying principle of the IR knowledge allowed in mainstream publications. Particularly in its connections to the sociology of knowledge, the Global IR agenda comes, then, as a strategy to scientifically name and shame IR gatekeepers into accepting more geographically diverse sources of knowledge in the discipline.

Wemheuer-Vogelaar et al. (2016) argue that Global IR has a two-fold approach to the general discipline. It evolves through normative accounts about non- or post-Western IR and a growing empirical literature, which look, for instance, into citation patterns to unveil the true

face of the discipline. Additionally, Risse et al. (2022) find that theoretical citations in WoS publications are centralized exclusively in authors based in the United States, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe and that, even though there might be “some theory citations in non-WoS journals referring to scholars of the particular region or country,” “these cites do not travel beyond the individual journal” (RISSE et al, 2022, p. 22):

Non-Western scholars appear to reproduce and engage IR theories originating in the transatlantic area, but their contribution to theory-building is rarely recognized in the non-WoS journals themselves. Moreover, these journals have rather little in common, as far as citations are concerned—except for their references to the transatlantic theory core (Idem).

Following this analysis, they conclude that IR has a core-periphery structure where “transatlantic core nodes are interconnected to each other and to some periphery nodes, while the periphery nodes are connected to the core but not to each other” (RISSE et al., 2022, p. 1). They also conclude that “knowledge produced in the periphery has to go through the transatlantic core in order to be recognized globally” (Idem). That might help explain why, after extensive research in Brazil and India, Alejandro (2019) concluded there is no “theoretically specific production” in those countries’ IR or that “thematic differences (focusing on national foreign policy and regional studies) exist but are experienced as national traditions rather than invested as a counter-hegemonic stance” (ALEJANDRO, 2019, p. 14).

Alejandro does not include macro-political elements in her attempt to explain this reality. She investigates those countries’ disciplinary incentives to internationalize their research outcomes. However, those countries’ social, economic, and political realities might have influenced how they theorize reality, and what she considers thematic differences might actually represent theoretical divergences. Publishing these theoretical divergences in international journals depend, among others, on these journals’ openness to these perspectives. Hence, what Alejandro calls “a lack of anti-hegemonic engagement” from Brazilian and Indian scholars who get to internationalize their publications might simply represent those international journals’ own biases.

For example, in Brazil, politics, economics, and society have significantly impacted the way IR is theorized. Even though Tickner’s (2003) concept of Latin American Hybrid (LAH)³ has a few shortcomings, such as the conflation of developmentalism and dependency theory,

³ According to Tickner (2003, p. 336), “[T]he Latin American hybrid approach draws upon distinct concepts derived from dependency theory, Morgenthauian realism, and interdependence.”

it underscores a reality in which local and regional ways of approaching social and economic challenges have influenced the way IR scholars theorize international politics. The political influence of developmentalism and dependency theory founders have shared in Latin American countries is also significant. For decades, individuals such as Celso Furtado and Fernando Henrique Cardoso have occupied the highest positions in those countries' decision-making processes, having, simultaneously, enjoyed significant respect in Academia.

Some Global North-based authors mention developmentalism and/or dependency theory as theoretical contributions from the Global South. However, these authors tend to be restricted to the field of International Political Economy (HOLSTI, 1985; GILPIN, 1987). Thus, it is hard to grasp precisely what Alejandro considers theoretical or thematic, but it is hardly accurate to assume that Brazilian IR shies away from anti-hegemonic engagement. Its anti-hegemonic engagements might be invisible to such databases as the WoS, but this does not at all entail its non-existence - and this invisibility might say more about gatekeeping in those publications than it does about Brazilian academia.

We use the Brazilian example here to show that the political landscape shapes how IR knowledge is developed in different countries. To investigate what these countries consider theoretical IR within their own debates demands the employment of anthropological lenses since one must listen carefully to what natives deem theoretical. In the Brazilian case, even though nationals might have tended to accuse IR Theory of being imperialistic, besides cursing universal epistemologies, this does not mean they simply write a-theoretical essays (CERVO, 2008a). Indeed, there are several conceptual frameworks embedded in political and philosophical traditions, like national developmentalism, that might not have yet traveled to the Global North (CERVO, 2008b; SARAIVA, 2009). As Rafael Bittencourt and Valéria Lopes argue in their article, a non-Western IR already exists in the Global South, but it is still demanding to be heard.

The political influence of the authors from these and other regional and national strands have exerted in society and academia has most definitely impacted the way IR Theory is developed in Brazil. Nevertheless, Kristensen and Alejandro stick to a strictly disciplinary, micro-social study of IR in countries like Brazil and India. By doing so, they miss the bigger picture as if it did not matter or mattered only indirectly as long as it affected the institutional and material bases of intellectual life. Indeed, they affect the institutional and material bases of intellectual life, and they do so directly. Suffice it to acknowledge that *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (RBPI), which dates back to 1958, spent most of the military dictatorship (1964-1985) publishing reports written by civilian and military officials. However, in 1979, when the regime

officially opened up, the journal began publishing authors from the national developmentalist strand, such as Helio Jaguaribe, who then published theoretical impressions of the Brazilian position in the international arena.

National developmentalism was instrumentalized by the authoritarian regime removing the social justice argument from the equation. While Cardoso, one of the founding fathers of the dependency theory, received funding from the Ford Foundation to discuss his theory all over Latin America, having founded the Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEPRAP) in São Paulo back in 1969, the first of the dictatorship's most repressive years, Jaguaribe and Furtado were exiled. However, when the regime officially started to open up, so did Brazilian IR's to this day best-ranked publication, RBPI, and it did so by incorporating national developmentalist theories through Jaguaribe's and Amado Cervo's work. That illustrates how much macro-political elements directly affect the discipline in Global South IR in general and Brazil in particular. Other macro-political constraints, such as social-economic factors, need to be explored. In other words, to understand the politics of knowledge production on IR, one must grasp the most general politics of power within the international system.

THE UNSPOKEN PROBLEM

It is essential to stress that much of the debate regarding Global North predominance in IR - particularly in IR theory - has focused on the kind of knowledge that is accepted as both a) valid academic knowledge and b) belonging to something (a discipline?) called IR. As we have argued, it is unquestionable that what is studied and published as mainstream IR follows clear geographical patterns that also correspond to epistemological and ontological delimitations: a (neo) positivist study of relations between sovereign states. Moreover, many of those claiming to speak for the Third World were or are based in elite institutions in developed countries,⁴ reproducing a global dynamic of academic dependency (BALLESTRIN, 2017).

The previously discussed criticism of the "Third Debate" within the IR discipline is very pertinent to Global IR, as a project that has been undoubtedly influenced by post-colonialism and mainly focused on the broadening of IR through academic critique. It is worth stressing that highlighting the importance of material conditions is not equal to downplaying the importance of culture, discourse or the relations between knowledge and power - in fact, several ar-

⁴ Both Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak taught mainly at Columbia University, an Ivy League institution in New York. Homi Bhabha is a professor at Harvard.

ticles in this special issue showcase how important they are. When neo-Marxists or decolonial authors critique post-colonialism for neglecting material conditions, they mean that understanding and dismantling colonialism and imperialism require tackling its indissoluble connection to capitalism and the economic subjugation of the Global South. When we say that this also has resonance for Global IR, we mean that these material conditions are also reflected in academia in ways that we, as scholars, are often uneasy about recognizing and exploring.

Firstly, as has been addressed already, the geopolitical interests of Global North countries tend to affect academic interests. Therefore, contributing to ranking works from Global South countries is more or less desirable for entrance into mainstream spaces, such as publications or conferences. That has certainly been the case in China, and the growing interest in “Chinese IR” or the “Chinese School” that has accompanied the country’s economic and political rise. This is not to say, of course, that these perspectives do not have intrinsic value. In this issue, Silva, Ferreira, and Leite show in their article *China’s Foreign Policy and International Cooperation: Humanitarian Aid as an Instrument for Approaching the Global South* that Beijing’s growth might have also allowed it to question international political practices and even ascribe new meaning to global concepts such as Humanitarian Aid and International Cooperation.

The Brazilian case provides an interesting example of political and economic performance shaping academic fates. The rise of IR as a discipline in Brazil accompanied the country’s rise in the international system. While Brazil was growing an average of 4.0% a year,⁵ leading multilateral initiatives such as the BRICS and IBSA, and campaigning for a seat in the UN Security Council, its IR disciplinary community also saw a massive expansion. Between 2003 and 2013, the number of IR undergraduate programs tripled, showcasing a growth rate that much surpassed the growth in higher education in general. The number of graduate programs in the field also increased: while there were only two at the beginning of the century, eleven new programs were established between 2002 and 2014 (BARASUOL; SILVA, 2016). Again, while the number of graduate programs in all fields grew in this period, more or less doubling in number according to Cirani, Campanado and Silva (2015), IR grew at a much higher rate. As Milani (2021) argues, this growth reflected an interest in international politics and foreign policy that mirrored Brazil’s increased prominence internationally.

Despite recent diversification, Brazilian IR has always focused on studying Brazilian Foreign Policy and has been heavily influenced by “diplomat intellectuals” and other poli-

5 Based on GDP growth data from the World Bank. Available at <<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>>.


cymakers (MILANI, 2021). Therefore, while new agendas entered Brazilian academic spaces accompanying their expansion, there was still much interest in analyzing the new, more active, creative, and assertive diplomacy put in place by President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva between 2003 and 2010 (AMORIM, 2010), which was primarily responsible for Brazil's higher international profile. This attention was not undue nor exclusive to Brazilian academia.

Along with other developing countries such as India and China, Brazil was questioning the structures of the "liberal" global order and seeking to reshape them more inclusively. Two articles in this issue explore the importance and legacy of the "Lula era": Patricia Rinaldi and Isabella Trevisan argue that Lula's administration sought to counter the hierarchical character that had historically been predominant in international cooperation for development, replacing it with a very structured symbolic framework to define its South-South cooperation in their article *South-South cooperation as counter-gift: Symbolic claims of the Lula administration's foreign policy in the Cotton-4 project*. In his turn, Jéser Abílio de Souza's article *Between representations and positions: analyzing Brazilian foreign policy discourses related to the theme of South American regional integration during the Lula administrations (2003-2010)* analyzes the role of regional integration in Brazilian diplomacy's quest to organize and transform power relations in the international system. Considering that President Lula is bound to begin his third term in 2023, reviewing his previous motivations and conditions concerning the international agenda is a timely matter.

A growing call for the consolidation of a "Brazilian IR" accompanied this moment of greater international assertiveness (CERVO, 2008b), which, in large part, sought to justify the need for a national perspective based on the notion of Brazil as a key "player" in a multipolar world (AMORIM, 2010). These calls reflected a critical tradition in Brazilian IR, connected to developmentalism and dependency theory, which rests on essential assumptions such as industrialization as the primary vector for economic development. While undoubtedly critical, it maintains some of the core tenets of 'mainstream' IR approaches, such as a focus on the nation-state as the leading international actor and a belief in the importance of power politics (though questioning the supposed anarchy of the international system on Marxist bases). That has sometimes put this tradition at odds with newer critical perspectives that have only recently entered the debate in Brazilian IR, such as feminism, post and decolonial, and indigenous perspectives. These approaches seek to unravel power relations that often happen intra- or transnationally and to question traditional concepts such as "state" and "development." Indeed, through their insights, one could even question some of the actions of Brazilian Foreign Policy, such as its role in leading the UN Mission for Stabilization of Haiti (Minustah).

Interestingly, this theoretical diversification was primarily made possible by what we consider the second-way material conditions affect academic practices: funding. While the above mentioned factors drove the interest in IR in Brazil (and in a “Brazilian IR”), its expansion was made possible by investment in higher education from the federal government, which grew steadily from 2004 to 2015. That meant not only a growth in enrollment in undergraduate and graduate programs (CIRANI; CAMPANARIO; SILVA, 2015) but also the strengthening of research since this budget includes stipends for graduate students, funding for promoting and attending conferences, and funding for research projects and international cooperation, as well as for accessing scientific journals.⁶ In a nutshell, not only did the country’s economy improve but also investment in research grew steeply in the period, as can be seen below:

Figure 1: Budget of the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) in Reais (2004-2020)



Source: made by the authors based on data from CAPES. Available at < <https://www.gov.br/capes/pt-br/aceso-a-informacao/institucional/orcamento-evolucao-em-reais> >.

⁶ While the private sector has a large share of undergraduate and professional graduate programs in Brazil, research is carried out mainly at public universities and funded by federal and (on a much smaller scale) local governments. Even at private universities, stipends for graduate students are provided by CAPES, CNPq (National Council for Scientific and Technical Development) or state foundations such as FAPESP (São Paulo Research Foundation).

As anyone in academia knows, research is not carried out in a vacuum. While entrance into ‘international’ academic spaces depends on surpassing epistemological and ontological barriers (that is, having one’s research accepted as ‘academic knowledge’ by peers), it also depends on transcending material barriers. Attending IR’s most prominent academic conference, International Studies Association’s Annual Conference (ISA), for instance, costs US\$80,00 for student members and US\$120,00 for non-student members making less than US\$20.000,00 a year. That means the registration alone will set you back between R\$440,00 and R\$700,00 (or R\$750,00 and R\$1.000,00 considering membership costs).⁷ A plane ticket to Montreal (the site of the 2023 ISA Conference) costs around R\$5.000,00. For comparison, the monthly stipend for a Masters student in Brazil is R\$1.500,00, for a Ph.D. student, it is R\$2.200,00, and the entrance salary for a professor in a federal university is R\$7.500,00 (after taxes). And Brazil’s minimum wage was R\$1.212,00 in 2022. The point of showing these figures is not merely to criticize ISA, which has a decent number of funding opportunities, but to bring attention to the real material costs of pursuing an international academic career.

The fact is that academia is a profoundly unequal space, which adds layers of its own inequalities to already existing ‘real-world’ hierarchies. Case in point: academic publishing. The academic journal is the main form of publishing academic content, and the one that adds the most prestige to one’s curriculum vitae. Currently, most of these publications require the payment of a subscription (usually by a university’s library) to access its entire contents or a fee for accessing individual articles. That is the case, for instance, of IR’s top ranked journals (according to SJR or h-index), such as International Organization, International Security, International Studies Perspectives, International Studies Quarterly, and even Third World Quarterly. The cost of accessing a paywalled article in one of these publications is between US\$15,00 (for International Security) and US\$47,00 (for, unbelievably, Third World Quarterly). While there are ways around the paywall (provided by controversial projects of shadow library websites), and some articles are open access, these hurdles come on top of an existing digital divide between North and South, and, more particularly, between those already disadvantaged in terms of access in the South.

These are just two examples of how material differences make being an academic in the Global South a different experience than in the North. It’s not just a matter of having a certain output such as an academic article or a book being accepted by gatekeepers - arriving

⁷ Data is from the International Studies Association (ISA) website. Available at < <https://www.isanet.org/Conferences/ISA2023/Registration> >. The conversion was based on the exchange rate for October 12, 2022 and rounded down.

at the gate is a most difficult challenge. The carrying out of research, the formatting and translating (both literally and figuratively) into something consumable by ‘international’ academic spaces, and entering these spaces implies real material costs.⁸ Not only that, but the fact that entrance into those spaces is considered the goal by academics in the South means that they are - for better and for worse - the site where academics from different parts of the South meet.

Of course, we must also consider the differences within the North and the South. While some universities in the North have billionaire endowments,⁹ others have been struggling financially. Indeed, increasingly “higher education is seen primarily as a private good, as a tradable commodity that can be subjected to the vagaries of national and international markets” (TILAK, 2008, p. 450). As such, it is perceived that one should rely less and less on public funding. The result has been a decline in public investment in higher education, even among high-income and upper-middle-income countries (Idem). In many cases, the response from institutions has been to cut costs, which has particularly affected the academic profession. As consequence, we see, for instance, the process of adjunctification in the United States or temporary teaching or researching contracts in the United Kingdom, Germany and other European countries.

To return to the Brazilian example, the two national funding institutions, CAPES and CNPq, had their budgets reduced by more than 50% since 2015 - a real loss of more than 90% in the case of CAPES, if one considers inflation. Few prospects of professional fulfillment, stagnant stipends that in some cases barely cover the cost of living, and other material and non-material costs combined to make academia a more exclusionary space. That means it becomes less accessible not only for scholars from the South but particularly for those already marginalized *in* the South. Even as a country in the Global South, Brazil reproduces many exclusions of the North. Despite initiatives, such as affirmative social quotas, to make higher education and academia more diverse, IR remains majorly white: only around 20% of undergraduate students declare themselves black, brown, or Asian.¹⁰ And as one climbs the academic ranks, this situation worsens: among the 352 faculty of eleven top-ranked IR programs in Brazil, only

8 Another example: a translation from Portuguese to English costs, on average, R\$0,15 per word. That means a more exclusionary space if you don’t write in English well enough but want to publish in an ‘international’ journal such as the ones mentioned, it will cost you around R\$1.200,00.

9 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the Universities in the United States with the largest endowments at the end of 2020 were Harvard University (\$42 billion), Yale University (\$31 billion), The University of Texas System (\$31 billion), Stanford University (\$29 billion), and Princeton University (\$26 billion). Available at < <https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=73> >.

10 Data from the Ministry of Education (MEC). Available at < <http://portal.mec.gov.br/docman/agosto-2017-pdf/71071-produto-2-estudo-trajetoria-profissionais-egressos-ri-pdf/file> >.

nine professors are Black, and only one is a black woman (SOARES; ALMEIDA, forthcoming). And while women are almost 60% of undergraduate students in IR, they are only 32% of professors (Idem). Unquestionably, groups already less represented in academia are being hit the hardest by the budget cuts, which will contribute to maintaining the lack of diversity we have described.

While we believe in the existence of a common Global South experience of shared anti-imperialistic struggles and colonial legacies and in the importance of having Global South's voices heard within IR, it is also essential to question what voices are being heard and why. As Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner argues in her interview in this issue, white academics already have an advantage of being perceived as "somehow more "familiar" than a Black or non-White Latino person," even if both are doing "non-Western" work. In addition, pieces that resemble what is produced in the North or are deemed to have enough "local flavor" (TICKNER; BLAINEY, 2012, p. 3) also tend to be better received. Global South authors should be cautious of becoming either translators that make radical concepts palatable to mild liberal academic spaces or exotic attractions. The point of entering these spaces is not to become part of something exclusive, but to make it less exclusionary, so that the diverse realities of the South (and North) can be better understood and to think collectively of solutions to our shared problems. Only then can the Global IR initiative be, indeed, a de-Westernizing movement in the long term.

CONCLUSION

In 2007, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan published an article asking, "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?". While this was not the first time the Western-centric character of IR was questioned,¹¹ this publication was very likely the first step in making this a more comprehensive conversation and building something we now call Global IR. Since then, many answers have been given to this question: it is because IR reflects great power competition and their foreign policy priorities; because it is based on an imperialist and Western-centric account of history; because of gate-keeping practices within academia, or even that there *are* non-Western theories of the international, but IR refuses to accept them.

In this introductory article, we chose not only to describe these previous accounts but add our contribution and explore some ways through which material conditions affect the (lack of) pluralization in IR. We believe that both geopolitical interests of the Global North -

11 See, for example, Neumann (1998), Weaver, (1998), or Tickner (2003). And of course, Hoffman (1977).

primarily tied to the economic and political rise of certain Global South states - and the more “mundane” issue of funding are essential pieces in this Western-centric puzzle - or labyrinth. Analyzing these issues raises questions concerning not only IR but the role academics do or should have in society and how inequalities in academia (both between North and South and *within* the North and the South) reflect inequalities in society and can indirectly contribute to their maintenance.

In the fifteen years since Acharya and Buzan’s article, what has become consensual is that de-Westernizing IR is an essential step forward within the discipline’s evolution. It has not been so easy, however, to agree on how exactly to achieve this. We believe - and this is the main motivation behind this special issue - that Global IR presents a valuable alternative to pluralize the discipline by promoting inclusion and reimagination and advancing academic power diffusion. That being said, it is not without its shortcomings. For example, by focusing on national contributions (or ‘schools’), it can promote other types of parochialism, and by focusing on academic critique, it might forget the material bases of knowledge production. The first issue, we believe, is easier to avoid. The second, however, would force academia to face issues that are inescapable to many and invisible to some - more often than not, those who keep the gates. We hope that this issue, written exclusively by academics from the Global South, working in the Global South, published in the Global South, in a 100% free access academic journal hosted at a public university, might be a good start.

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