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
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Brazilian Military Geopolitics and the Security of Critical Infrastructures: the management strategy of a new territorial system

*Geopolítica Militar Brasileira e a Segurança das Infraestruturas
Críticas: a estratégia de gestão de um novo sistema territorial*

*Geopolítica Militar Brasileña y Seguridad de las Infraestructuras
Críticas: la estrategia de gestión de un nuevo sistema territorial*

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ABSTRACT: This paper strives to answer the following question: to what extent the geopolitical mindset of the Brazilian Military may influence Jair Bolsonaro's governmental policy for territorial defense? Whereupon, our goal is to investigate the relationship between the Military's geopolitical practice and discourse and Jair Bolsonaro's government policies for territorial defense. To that effect, our methodology includes bibliographical revision, survey of speeches present in official documents, and data gathering regarding military participation in Jair Bolsonaro's government. The purpose is to examine State militarization and the implementation of Brazil's Security and Critical Infrastructure program through the regionalization of such structures and the geopolitical discourse of military officials, as well as how this influences territorial formation. The confirmed hypotheses indicate that the Brazilian Military produces thought that elaborates on maintaining political control over territory, especially in reoccurring periods of State militarization and Critical Infrastructures are instruments of this goal.

Keywords: geopolitics; armed forces; territory; critical infrastructures.

RESUMO: Este trabalho parte do seguinte problema: em que medida o pensamento geopolítico das Forças Armadas brasileiras influencia as políticas territoriais de defesa do Governo Jair Bolsonaro? Assim, nosso objetivo é averiguar a relação entre os discursos e práticas geopolíticas das Forças Armadas e as políticas territoriais de defesa do Governo Jair Bolsonaro. Para tanto, nossa metodologia compreende a revisão da bibliografia, a análise dos discursos presentes nos documentos oficiais e a coleta de dados sobre a participação dos militares no Governo de Jair Bolsonaro. O intuito é averiguar a militarização do Estado e a execução do programa de Segurança de Infraestruturas Críticas, através da regionalização dessas estruturas e a análise dos discursos geopolíticos dos militares. As hipóteses confirmadas indicam que as Forças Armadas pensam na manutenção do controle político sobre o território, nos recorrentes períodos



militarização do Estado e que as Infraestruturas Críticas são instrumentos desse objetivo.

Palavras-chave: geopolítica, forças armadas, território, infraestruturas críticas.

RESUMEN: Este trabajo se basa en el siguiente problema: ¿en qué medida el pensamiento geopolítico de las Fuerzas Armadas brasileñas influye en las políticas de defensa territorial del gobierno de Jair Bolsonaro? Nuestro objetivo es investigar la relación entre los discursos y prácticas geopolíticas de las Fuerzas Armadas y las políticas de defensa territorial del gobierno Bolsonaro. La metodología incluye revisión de la literatura, análisis de discursos en documentos oficiales y compilación de datos sobre la participación de los militares en el gobierno Bolsonaro. El objetivo es investigar la militarización del Estado y la implementación del programa de Seguridad de Infraestructuras Críticas, mediante la regionalización de estas estructuras y análisis de los discursos geopolíticos de los militares. Las hipótesis confirmadas indican que las Fuerzas Armadas pretenden mantener el control político sobre el territorio durante los períodos recurrentes de militarización del Estado y que las Infraestructuras Críticas constituyen instrumentos de este objetivo.

Palabras Clave: geopolítica; fuerzas armadas; territorio; infraestructuras críticas.

Introduction

Brazil's political and economic history is outlined by major federal deals woven with the intention of ensuing the private appropriation and ownership of the land and its resources by the local ruling classes (Schwarcz, 2019). During Jair Bolsonaro's government (2019–2022) the recipe was no different. This paper strives to answer the following question: to what extent the geopolitical mindset of the Brazilian Military may influence Jair Bolsonaro's governmental policy for territorial defense? When searching for answers within the specialized bibliography (Carvalho, 2019; Monteiro, 2021), the authors draw attention to a historical dilemma faced by members of the Brazilian military: considering the military's recurring intervention episodes in domestic politics, the Armed Forces are yet to decide whether they should act as servicemen or leading actors in what concerns State administration and territorial management.

In addition, since the end of the Military Regime (1964–1985), part of the military sector has not joined in the re-democratization process and still partakes in the idea that Brazilian democracy was a deal bestowed by the Military and sanctioned by its power of *permanent guardianship of the nation*. A similar process was also undertaken by other South American countries. Hereby, despite literature presenting some other indications, we return to the contributions by Costa (2016), which state that during the Military Regime, the servicemen that constituted the government were educated in the so-called *Brazilian Military Geopolitics*, comprised by an ensemble of speeches and narratives over territory and power as well as directions as to the development of a national strategy. In that regard, this study aims at investigating the relationship between the geopolitical discourses and practices of the Armed Forces as it relates to Jair Bolsonaro's governmental policies for territorial defense.

In what regards the justification of this research, we would like to point out that, after over thirty years since the end of Military Dictatorship, the 2018 elections brought upon the return of the Armed Forces to the center of political power¹. Firstly, with the support given to Jair Bolsonaro's candidacy, and later through the significant participation of military officials assigned to positions within the Federal Executive Branch. To this effect, we found that speeches and actions carried out by Bolsonaro's government, as a result of the influence of the Military Geopolitical mindset, aims to exercise power through political control of the territory. Thus, the institutional reorganization of State structure through a vast Cabinet reform as well as the militarization of politics, processes carried out during his government, demonstrate as Gottmann (1973) states, that national territory is perceived as a category of security. Whereupon, if the objective is controlling spatial dynamics, it is necessary to analyze these actions through Political Geography, on the other hand, when discussing actors such as the Armed Forces, we need to also include a perspective based on International Security Studies.

Regarding the methodological referral, the proposed question was investigated with the goal of finding an answer as well as to confirm our hypotheses: a) the Brazilian Armed Forces think about the maintenance of political control over the territory, especially in the recurrent periods of State militarization and permanent pursuit of National Objectives; b) the Critical Infrastructures represent the Brazilian Armed Forces' strategic aim at insuring the maintenance of political control over the territory.

¹ Due to recent news about the planning of a coup d'état developed and orchestrated by part of the members of the Brazilian Armed Forces after the 2023 Presidential Election and within the high echelon of the Government, we realize that the then President of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro, was not the main military figure. Confirming, that way, the theses by Piero Leirner (2020), the military has had the intention of returning to power since the end of the Military Dictatorship. As such, the main actor of this analysis is the movement of the corporation itself rather than a specific name within the government. The time frame of the research spreads across a good portion of the New Republic, thus, we will not individualize responsibilities, but we want to point out the relationship between military geopolitics and the territorial defense policies.

Hence, regarding the outline, we carried out the description and investigation of the problem proposed in five sections. At first, in the introduction, we present our research problem, the overall objective, the justification, and the methodology. After which, in the second section, we set out to understand the ways of territorial political control in its theoretical and conceptual bases. Thus, detecting the ways in which the knowledges of Geography are used as instrumental means to guarantee the territorial strategies and the appropriation of the assets of power, especially in the name of the security of the State. Next, we went on to investigate the execution of the National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Security (Plansic), associated with the Institutional Security Cabinet (Gabinete de Segurança Institucional), Decree 11.200, of 2022. To this end, in the third and fourth sections, respectively, we analyzed the Critical Infrastructure program as a means to shape a territorial network as well as how the policy was implemented by the national armed forces. In that respect, we set out to investigate the action of Jair Bolsonaro's Government and its consequences in national territory, as the groups that rose to power in 2018 sought to materialize less of a project for national development and more of an appropriation of the national territory as a means to promote its integration and to guarantee the exploitation of its resources. Thus, understanding, through these debates, the way in which the military, guided by their geopolitical discourse, makes use of the militarization of the State as a means to appropriate the territory and carry out localized investments in the name of national security. At last, in the final section, we present the conclusion of our work.

In respect to the specific procedures, our research consists, firstly, of a literature review (articles, books, official documents, etc.) of the qualitative character of the concepts and theories that could support our analyses of reality and as a means to get initially acquainted with the object of our investigation. For such a necessary catalogue registry of the studied materials helped us in the investigation of our sampling and in the reunion of the main discourses that guide the actions of the object of this research. Following that, we collected data referring to the participation of the military in Jair Bolsonaro's government (2019-2022), seeking to demonstrate the militarization process that occurred in this period. Afterwards, we collected the quantitative data and the analysis of the conclusions presented in the reports by the Institutional Security Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic Management (Gestão do Gabinete de Segurança Institucional da Presidência da República (GSI/PR)), between the years of 2008 and 2022, among other organizational bodies and transparency agencies. Next, we studied the pertinent legislation in force: National Policy for Critical Infrastructure Security (Política Nacional de Segurança de Infraestruturas Críticas (PNSIC)) (Dec. nº 10.569/2018), the National Strategy Critical Infrastructure Security (Estratégia Nacional de Segurança de Infraestruturas Críticas (Ensic)) (Dec. nº 10.569/2020), and the National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Security (Plano Nacional de Segurança de Infraestruturas Críticas (Plansic)) (Dec. nº 11.200/2022).

In that regard, the analysis of the data gathered was carried out on two axes: firstly, through the qualitative analysis of theoretical discussions, i.e., via historically constructed discourses, demonstrating how they guided the Armed Forces performance during Jair Bolsonaro's government. Secondly, the data regarding the militarization of Jair Bolsonaro's government and the legislation built to implement these policies were analyzed by mapping out the Critical Infrastructures. In short, we investigated the relationship between the military geopolitical discourse and how it affects the construction of the territories.

The Meaning of Territory and Security Production

To understand the political importance of physical spaces, we return to one of the essential categories of Geography, the conceptualization of territory: “territory is a portion of geographical space that coincides with the spatial extent of a government's jurisdiction. It is the physical container and support of the body politic organized under a governmental structure.” (Gottmann, 2012, p. 523). Thus, territory is considered to be the essential link between physical space and politics, meaning a portion of geographical space defined by a body of law and a government unit, as it is through these organizations that human groups divide up the space and extract from it the conditions to live. “[...] it must never be forgotten that the relationship between sovereignty and territory is built upon a connecting link: *the people* in the territory or, if it is devoid of permanent settlements, at least *the activities of people* within the territory” (Gottmann, 1973, p. 4).

Thus, when studying the evolution and political use of physical space throughout the history of western society, Gottmann detects, in the dynamics and manners used to appropriate a physical space, the different meanings attributed to territory. Ergo, if the ways of territorialization—be it the construction or destruction of territories—occur in dual movements of density or dispersion, closure or openness, settlement or fluidity, whatever the case, the emphasis is that it must be accessible, since accessibility is a prerequisite and a control factor of the jurisdiction (Gottmann, 1973; Raffestin, 1993). Therefore, “the concept of territory appears in this study as a psychosomatic device and its evolution as closely related to the human striving for security, opportunity, and happiness” (Gottmann, 1973, p. 10). Yet:

If a territory is the model compartment of space resulting from partitioning, diversification, and organization, it may be described as endowed with two main functions: to serve on the one hand as a shelter for security and on the other hand as a springboard for opportunity. Both security and opportunity require an internal organization of the territory as well as a subsequent organization of its external relations. An element of conflict is built into the functions of the territory, and behind them looms a contradiction in the purposes of territorial sovereignty and of

political independence: the search for security will often clash with the yearning for broader opportunity. The former calls for relative isolation, the latter for some degree of interdependence with the outside (Gottmann, 1973, p. 14).

According to Castro (2009), there are three subjective components that constitute the symbolic elements of “iconographies”: religion, political past, and social organization. The term iconography “[...] means reflected image, simulacrum, spirit reflection, similarity, and, often, when referenced to the symbolic cement of the peoples: attitudes towards the physical world, it also facilitates the maintenance of certain structures” (p. 26). In this way, the processes of spatial division and organization are explained by the search for security versus opportunity: “[...] through the dialectics existing between the circulation forces, responsible for changes imposed by the outside”, and “[...] iconography, which represents the forces of resistance to these changes found in the symbols and beliefs of territorially defined groups” (Castro, 2009, p. 27). To this effect, territory as security is the perception of space as shelter, that is to say, a space that seeks to maintain its organizational sovereignty and contain external exchanges through a closed territorial system. On the other hand, territory as opportunity means the maintenance of an open territorial system in search of promoting the circulation of resources, people, knowledge, and products.

Thereby, if “every spatial practice, even an embryonic one, is induced by a system of actions or behaviors that translate into a ‘territorial production’ that causes mesh, knot, and net to intervene” (Raffestin, 1993, p. 150), territorial political control may occur in both a zonal way and through a network control of circulation, that is, through establishing more open or closed circuits. “Territory is a particular kind of asset; it represents, at the same time, resource and obstacle, content and continent. Territory is, by excellence, a political space, the action field where assets are at play.” (Raffestin, 1993, pp. 59–60). Ergo, changes in power structure—in the intentionality of the actors—also mean changes in the compartmentalization and hierarchization of space, being that strategies to regain the ability to exert power are, above all, geared to the recovery of a territorial network (Raffestin, 1993). For this reason, we understand that the exercise of sovereignty over a territory may have the goal of ensuring control of its populations and systems of circulation, the geopolitical assets by excellence (Ó Tuathail, Dalby & Routledge, 2003).

In that way, from a biopolitical perspective, which attempts to regulate populations as biological and political problems, it is understood that the control of these assets occurs through territorial strategies (Foucault, 2008). In that respect, circulation networks manifest the actors' dynamics and strategies, as it is not merely a matter of separating but, also, of differentiating circulation and contingency spaces. A “territorial system” comprises the general framework of its organizational subsets: knots, meshes, and networks—allowing for

the integration and cohesion of territories. In that direction, changes in power structure also mean changes in the role and duties that a given system is called to undertake.

Hence, ever since Reason of State has emerged, a connection between political sovereignty and economic, biological, and cultural security has been established: a division of the physical space into political units with delimited territorial jurisdictions (Steinberg, 2009; Foucault, 2008). Thereupon, “[...] it is interesting to notice how, through the lever of sovereignty as a fundamental problem, we notice the emergence of a certain number of urban roles, per se: economic roles, moral roles, and administrative roles” (Foucault, 2008, p. 19–20)². In other words, a quest by governments to connect the political effectiveness of sovereignty to a distribution of the physical space concerning the regulation of its circulation and flux. According to Steinberg (2009), Modern State represents a unit regarding three elements: sovereignty, in the form of political unity; territorialization, with the establishment of physical delimitations where territory control is operated based on a set of sovereign laws; and as an external unit, when several sovereign powers recognize each other. Thus, territorial ordering becomes strategic for the exercise of sovereignty, given that it is applied in domestic and international territorial contexts, balancing itself between the political arena, characterized by fixed assets, and the economic arena, represented by movable assets (Steinberg, 2009); between territory as security or opportunity.

Thereby, “[...] security is an ever-crucial factor in socio-political organizations, as it is pursued as an intervention instrument capable of guaranteeing itself and as a discursive strategy aimed at establishing its need” (Bazzicalupo, 2014, p. 81). In other words, we understand security as a production process that unites the discourse around safety, that states its needs and justification—the values to be protected—and its effectiveness, which is how this process materializes in territorial practices. Foucault (2008) understands that the State, through governmentality, the form in which modern society organizes and regulates populational behavior and individual conduct, assumed the task of solving security issues by means of “[...] identifying subjects to be protected and threats against which protection is needed” (Bazzicalupo, 2014, p. 89). To this end, security devices such as “safety and police apparatuses” are used to “[...] classify the individual as integrable or undesirable to the community” (Bazzicalupo, 2014, p. 84). In other words, a difference is established between the holder of the “means of production” and the individuals to whom this production is directed.

Thus, a context of political management of threats is established; that is to say, its production is related to the perception of the actors at play, since “[...] the threat does not exist in itself, but it is only constituted and acted out through the perception of whomever is, or feels, threatened” (Saint-Pierre, 2013, p. 27). According to Monteiro (2021, p. 33), “threat is an efficient device, since it is its existence that gives shape to political structure—especially as it relates to the use of police and

² tradução livre

military apparatus in the management of populations and territories—which is only justified in the face of a threat”. Therefore, the key point is the distinction made between the decision-makers responsible for the security discourses and those affected by its practices: the affected ones, usually, do not have an active voice, representing groups that are perceived as threats and are excluded from benefits originated from discourse and policy. On the other hand, security actions will be directed precisely against these groups, since such individuals are identified as threats that need to be eradicated. Hence, although the social function of territory places greater emphasis on economic opportunity, in periods of crisis and deprivation, emphasis on territory as shelter may be regained (Gottmann, 1973; 2012).

For that reason, we bring forth a recent phenomenon observed at a global level: It has become increasingly easy to find—be it in Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan's presidency, in Poland with Andrzej Duda, in Hungary with Viktor Orbán, with Donald Trump in the United States, Matteo Salvini in Italy, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, or Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela—different governments that, despite not being directly orchestrated among themselves, end up dialoguing through the use of analogous models: some kind of authoritarian populism that has been testing the institutional resilience of democracy in their respective countries (Schwarcz, 2019, p. 226).

The conservative and reactionary turn brought about by Jair Bolsonaro's rise to power since the 2018 Elections adds Brazil to the list. Thereby, we evaluated geopolitical discourses and practices resulting from this shared vision of territory as security—as a place of shelter against threats to the values that are to be protected by the State. It is important to note that in Brazil, “[...] the victory of the presidential slate and of all candidates adhered to it was due, in a large extent, to the association of their personal images to the ethical values, institutional principles, and elevated notion of the Armed Forces” (Souza, 2021, p. 127), which now return to the center of the political arena by assuming positions in the Executive Branch.

Critical Infrastructure Protection Programs

Authors such as Foucault (2008) and Raffestin (1993) have already emphasized the importance of infrastructure and circulation systems as a means of political control of territories; therefore, the strategic perception of protection of said infrastructures and the continuity of services provided. However, the debate involving Critical Infrastructures is directly related to changes arising from the opening of the security agenda in the 1990s and the perception of its multidimensionality. Therefore, for rapprochement purposes:

Critical infrastructures are facilities, networks and assets that ensure public goods and services and therefore, in case of failure or destruction, could affect national security. These sectors are increasingly exposed to a broad spectrum of phenomena that can interrupt or disrupt their services: terrorism, cyberattacks, industrial espionage, natural hazards, pandemics, and other events that directly or indirectly compromise physical security. In this sense, they are systemically relevant sectors that go from the energy, water and food supply, waste disposal and nuclear industry, to information and communication technology, finance, health, and chemical industries (Iglesias, 2021, p. 24).

Therefore, the context that justified the emergence of the first Critical Infrastructure Protection programs (CIP) is connected to the terrorist attacks of the early 2000s (Guterres, 2016; Demeterco, 2011). Episodes which have moved governments to rethink their internal security agendas. Ergo, the term CIP refers to a new context of risk prevention and regulation, as it not only concerns physical defense against immediate threats but also actions and measures regarding preventive security. Moreover, greater interdependence between the different sectors of the economy and the consequent context of greater vulnerability increases the concern with “ripple effects”, that is, when an affected sector may trigger a chain reaction, paralyzing other sectors of the economy.

Thus, the opening of the security agenda presents a new context for justifying action by the State in the face of a broad agenda of risks as well as the need to protect strategic structures. “While each country and multilateral organization has its own definition and, sometimes, even differing terms to refer to this matter, a consensus has grown around the importance of protecting critical infrastructures” (Iglesias, 2021, p. 24). That is why we speak of the development of a “global culture” of CIP programs. So, “essential assets” within this context “are deemed critical because their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the national security and the economic and social welfare of a nation” (Brunner & Suter, 2009, p. 35). However, it is important to highlight:

Current security threats are less straightforward, and the volatility of the geopolitical, environmental, and social context is rather the rule. Consequently, there is a consensus that the best way of tackling this ambiguity is through risk management and building resilience, for which a whole-of-society approach is needed (Iglesias, 2021, p. 24).

With that given, we cannot disregard the arguments by Monteiro (2021) and Saint-Pierre (2013) concerning the political management of threats and risks. Although the science of Regulation and Risk Management seeks doctrines to justify its regulatory frameworks, in reality, such discourses reinforce the hierarchy established in the production of security. Therefore, especially in CIP

programs, we understand that risk appears, on the one hand, within a forecasting and monitoring scenario, and on the other hand, with the development of a culture of persuasion that establishes for civil society, companies, and the State itself the set of values that are to be protected. Wherefore, the audience shall be convinced less by scientific arguments but, above all, by the ability the political administrators will have in assuring the existence of threats to society's security and well-being (Bazzicalupo, 2014).

In that respect, “there is no global consensus on the best methodology to protect a country's CIs” (Miranda Filho, 2012, p. 81). For this reason, programs are essentially differentiated by the methodologies adopted to identify critical structures and risk management models; in Brazil's case, the national model was “snatched” from the experiences conducted by the United States and the European Union. The United States' CIP program, one of the pioneers in this field, was defined in 2001 and consolidated in 2006 with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and updated in 2009 and 2013³ (U.S. DHS, 2013). In the European Union, the debate starts in 2005 with the “Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection”, in response to the London and Madrid terrorist attacks and the possibility of future attacks on European Critical Infrastructures (European Union Council, 2008).

In short, CIP programs involve the participation of stakeholders—owners and operators of infrastructure—focusing on domestic security actions in order to ensure the resilience of vital network chains and service provision (Iglesias, 2021). For that, they consider internal and external interdependencies, information exchange between stakeholders, and the methodology applied in threat identification—human actions, natural disasters, and the occurrence of technical human or failures (U.S. DHS, 2013; Conselho da União Europeia, 2008). Ultimately, both the Armed Forces and police agents may assist in the construction of CIP programs, especially in the implementation phases. Yet, usually, they wouldn't be the main formulators of methodology—in charge of assigning objectives, priority areas, and the agents' responsibilities—but only one of the many interested parties.

The Brazilian Critical Infrastructure Protection Program

In Brazil, the CIP program had already been fully developed by the time it was implemented by the Federal Government, adopting an all-hazards approach model. In 2006, as a result from a visit by President Lula to the state of São Paulo, where PCC (Primeiro Comando da Capital/Capital's First Command, PCC in its Portuguese acronym, the most resonant criminal faction in Brazil) violently

³ See Hayden (2020) for more information regarding the history of the United States Program as well as other countries in the European Union.

acted, it was decided that it was necessary to identify the institutions that needed to have their security prioritized (Demeterco, 2014). In August of that same year, the then Chief Minister of the GSI (Institutional Security Cabinet in its Portuguese acronym) was put in charge of bringing the regulatory agencies together to discuss aspects related to the critical infrastructures, on which occasion a representative of the US government shared the experience of the DHS.

Broadly defined, the Brazilian critical infrastructures include the areas of oil, electric energy, and telecommunications. More specifically, the SecGov 2006 conference held in Brasilia in November 2006 and sponsored by the Institutional Security Cabinet (Gabinete de Segurança Institucional/GSI) had the aim of discussing topics and questions on Critical Infrastructure Security in Brazil, Information and Communication, Security and Terrorism, and so on. Eight discussion panels took place on the following topics: Public Safety, Energy, Finance, Transportation Systems, Water Supply, Public Health, Telecommunications, and Terrorism. Although the Brazilian government has not formally defined what the critical infrastructures are, at least the first seven topics are considered unofficially to represent critical sectors (Brunner & Suter, 2009, p. 83-84).

Thus, SecGov in 2006 brought together specialists from the public and private sectors to prepare a White Paper on Critical Infrastructures, in an attempt to map out threats and develop a document to be published in 2007. However, parallel to that, Brazil signed a series of international commitments: “[...] to host the 2007 Pan American and Parapan American Games, the 2013 FIFA Football Confederations Cup, the 2014 FIFA Football World Cup, and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games” (Guterres, 2016, p. 149). Ergo, due to the urgency of GSI's demands and the perception of the country's vulnerabilities in the face of such international attention, it was decided that a program designed to guarantee the protection of the essential infrastructure needed for hosting the events had to be built.

Thereby, the following year, alongside agencies of the telecommunications sector, GSI opted for the construction of a Critical Infrastructure Identification Methodology (MI²C) used in Rio de Janeiro for the Pan American Games (Brunner & Suter, 2009; Tome, 2009). Under GSI's responsibility, and after this first experience, Brazil became the first country in South America and the last one of the so-called “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, China, India, and South Africa) to build a CIP program, the key point being that the topic entered the country's security agenda not to leave any time soon.

Decree 6.371/2008 (Brasil, 2008) draws the legal basis that centralizes the actions within the scope of the Chamber of Foreign Affairs and National Defense (Creden in its Portuguese acronym), an organization chaired by GSI's Chief Minister, that should carry out the relevant actions for the security

Critical Infrastructures (IEC or SIC in its Portuguese acronyms), including the services provided and the management of the areas. The articulation of strategic sectors and the division of tasks were carried out through the creation of Technical Groups, which were responsible for proposing actions regarding the IEC in each of the areas. According to the “Art. 2nd—IEC are to be considered facilities, services, and goods that, if interrupted or destroyed, would provoke a serious impact be it social, economic, political, international, or to national security” (Brasil, 2008, online). Therefore, despite the definition of IEC itself, we emphasize the fact that “[...] the term Critical Infrastructure Protection is used internationally. Brazil adopted the term Security because it is considered more comprehensive, as it includes the continuity of management of the business” (Demeterco, 2011, p. 8), and so, on a national level, we talk in terms of Security of Critical Infrastructures.

Moreover, the priority areas or strategic services would be: Energy; Transportation; Water; Telecommunications; and Finance (Brasil, 2008). In that regard, because of the urgent vision of GSI, unlike what was discussed in 2006, areas such as the Defense Industry, Public Security, Health, and Food services were not prioritized, even when compared to other international experiences (Brunner & Suter, 2009). Be as it may, it is interesting that the US document states: “This National Plan identifies certain lifeline functions that are essential to the operation of most critical infrastructure sectors. These lifeline functions include communications, energy, transportation, and water” (U.S. DHS, 2013, p. 17). As it seems, the Brazilian government, inspired by the US program, chose to prioritize the areas that represent the vital chains of IECs, which are the sectors that support the country's economic and social well-being and are organized in complex interdependent networks.

Another point is that the SIC program in Brazil was developed through the centralization of procedures within the public administration, since each Technical Group would be formed only by state institutions and organizations, formally excluding the private sector, the academy, and civil society (Brasil, 2008; Brasil, 2022). The point to be made is that the Critical Infrastructures have received extensive attention from the Armed Forces, as it was up to the military and the GSI to diagnose the vulnerabilities, prevent threats, and create Technical Groups designated to work in the specific areas.

In that respect, parallel to the inclusion of SIC in the list of the Armed Forces' tasks, in 2010 a restructuring process of the Army's doctrine and strategic projects began based on three premises: the need to reformulate the doctrine, to occupy internal territories, and to maintain the compulsory military service (Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército—CCOMSEx, 2012). This context allowed the military to perform in real-life territory and population management laboratories, assuming the role of the government in a series of marginal and underdeveloped areas such as the Amazon Forest, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the Peace Operation in Haiti, and the monitoring of

national borders (Monteiro, 2021; Leirner, 2020). Therefore, the military engaged in carrying out actual “psychological operations” (Opsi in its Portuguese acronym) and security practices within the geopolitical security scope, meaning “[...] a board representation where internally geared psychological operations (targeting the center of the political nucleus) were to be combined with validated routine territorial practices in which the police and the Armed Forces are engaged” (Monteiro, 2021, p. 22). And so, it is in this game of bundling up the pieces between internal and external threats, along with reinforcing its role as the guarantor of law and order, that the military builds justifications for operating under a process of uncertainty of criteria; withal, the response is what remains, because despite the multidimensional and transnational character of the phenomenas, the alternative chosen to resolve the disorder is always military.

Thereupon, using the same concept built by GSI in 2008, the Brazilian Army started to consider the protection of Critical Infrastructures as a strategic dimension of its functions from 2012 onward. This way, through a program known as PROTEGER (its Portuguese acronym meaning: to protect), it would be up to the Army to assume the role of guaranteeing the security of the Strategic Land Structures, or Critical Infrastructures, of the network chains that are vital for the nation (Rodrigues et al., 2018; CCOMSEx, 2012). So, let us go over the intentionality of the expression Critical Infrastructure Protection, because that would be one of the strategic elements for maintaining the so-called integrated or national security:

Integrated Protection [or Security] is the capacity to protect society while guaranteeing the maintenance of the Constitutional Powers, of the Guarantee of Law and Order, of the protection of Strategic Structures, of the prevention and fight against terrorist actions, and the participation of the F Ter [Terrestrial Force, the same as Army] in actions along the Border Boundaries, with ample collaboration from the public security sector (Rodrigues *et al.*, 2018, p. 95).

Thus, although the terms are current, the wording choice must be critically analyzed. The concept of integrated security refers to a context of bundling together defense and homeland security, ensuring society's protection—in the figure of the nation—as well as the protection of the State, with the Armed Forces progressively taking on more and more domestic security tasks. Thereby, it was through PROTEGER that the Army became directly involved with IEC assisting GSI in the monitoring and the actions against potential threats.

However, since it was not considered relevant in the context of the economic and political crisis the country was going through, the Brazilian program was discontinued in 2015, despite these initiatives. In that respect, in spite of the context of hosting international events, it is possible to state that the Brazilian government had not been able to consolidate risk management mechanisms for IECs.

Also, Brazil did not have a CIP program with an effective application until 2016. On the other hand, since the beginning of Michel Temer's government term (2016-2018), we can observe a restructuring of the GSI that is much stronger in the intelligence area, centralizing defense policies in the hands of the military and fulfilling the Armed Forces' long-standing desire to return to power after the end of the dictatorship (Leirner, 2020).

Results:

In regards to the results found, we highlight the data gathering on the militarization of Jair Bolsonaro's government as well as the analysis of current legislation: the National Policy (PNSIC), the National Strategy (Ensic), and the National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Security (Plansic)—all of them being decrees linked to GSI. Regarding the military participation in the government, we understand that their occupation of political and administrative positions is a good measure of the level of the political involvement of the Armed Forces (Carvalho, 2019). Thereby, we must understand what militarizing something means:

By militarization understand three things: firstly, the direct participation or occupation by the military in “civil” public administration posts (or in positions traditionally reserved for civilians)—the approach here is purely quantitative yet relevant as a measuring instrument; then, the influence of military doctrines on government decisions (the impact [...] in public policy formulation); at last, militarization indicates the transfer of values and norms from the Armed Forces to the decision-making process and to the political system as a whole (Codato, 2005, p. 7).

Therefore, these are the three fronts that will help in understanding the meaning of the Armed Forces participation in the government. However, we emphasize that we understand the militarization process less by the direct presence of the military but, above all, due to the influence of military doctrines on government decisions as well as the transfer of norms and values from the Armed Forces to the political system. Hence, the perception of territory as security, resulting from the theater of operations thought in terms of military action, “pushed” the Armed Forces to embrace a project that installs its equipping apparatus within the State itself. According to Leirner (2021, p. 124), “What do they aim for? [...] to promote a refoundation of the State so that they can operate as 'system administrators', to use a computational metaphor”. Thereby, from 2018 onward, not only numerous military officials were elected into public office positions, but they also began to occupy executive government roles.

On August 7th, 2020, Brazil had 9 ministers who were, at the time, Armed Forces career officials, corresponding to 40.9% of the total of 22 ministries. Moreover, most of the high-level

positions of trust were being held by Army officials. Proportionately, the Palácio do Planalto had greater military presence at that moment than during the period of the Brazilian Military Regime (1964-1985) (Amorim Neto & Acácio, 2020; Fuccille, 2021). Furthermore, on July 2020, the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU) surveyed the number of active and reserve military officials holding positions in the civil public service, revealing, thereby, that a total of 6,157 military active and reserve officials were holding civil positions in Bolsonaro's government, which represented an increase of 108.22% when compared to 2016 (Schmidt, 2022b). However, to better understand the operation of equipping the State with military apparatus, we will go further. We may state, based on the data built upon the technical notes from the Institute of Applied Economic Research, that throughout Jair Bolsonaro's government there was the development of “[...] a set of norms that expands the possibilities of military presence in the civil bureaucracy, which indicates the possibility of increasing the ongoing militarization of civil bureaucracy” (Schmidt, 2022b, p. 6). In that regard, there was a clear signal from the Executive power in addressing the Armed Forces corporate demands in the form of salary increases and the possibility of military officials serving in executive government positions.

On the other hand, to understand militarization in its qualitative character, we must investigate the influence of military doctrines in the formulation of public policies and the nature of the positions being held, in other words, how the worldview of the military determined State organization. Thus, despite the general increase of military participation in civilian posts and functions between 2018 and 2019, the nature of the occupancy of federal state companies and regulatory agencies, with officials being appointed to functions in Positions of Special Nature (SN), Direction and Advice (DA), and Commissioned Functions of the Executive Branch (CFEB), calls for attention since they are precisely the positions of leadership and command (Schmidt, 2022b). “In the case of commissioned positions with greater decision-making power—those of a Special Nature—the percentages of military personnel in total positions are much more relevant, going from 6.3% in 2013 to almost 16% in 2021” (Schmidt, 2022a, p. 8), and “[...] the presence of military personnel in DA positions levels 5 and 6, which are the posts with the greatest decision-making power within the Special Nature posts' hierarchy, increased, respectively, 500% and 375% between 2013 and 2021” (Schmidt, 2022a, p. 8).

Therefore, the occupation of posts by area of public policy may be analyzed through a classification of the exercising bodies into six large groups: Government, Economy, Infrastructure, Social, Environment, and Control (Schmidt, 2022b). In that regard, except for the control area, the military represented the largest portion of office holders in all other areas:

The “Government”, which compiles, on top of the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the Republic, portfolios such as Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Public

Security was the area of public policy with the most expressive participation of the military. However, it is observed that between 2013 and 2018 a dispersive movement begins, presenting a decrease in the relative importance of the “Government” area in detriment of the other areas, especially within the Economic, Social, and Infrastructure sectors (Schmidt, 2022a, p. 8).

Thereupon, we understand the militarization process in a qualitative way through the nature of the positions held, them being management positions in regulatory agencies, in High-Echelon posts, in Secretariats, and in public companies, in addition to strategic areas of government action, such as portfolios within the Government, Economic, Social, and Infrastructure sectors. Moreover, “although in much smaller proportions than in other areas, the magnitude of the relative expansion observed in the environmental sector in the period is worth mentioning” (Schmidt, 2022b, p. 20), resembling this way a militarization process similar to the one of the Military Regime, when strategic portfolios concerned the areas of Politics and Geography—i.e., energy, communications, security, infrastructure, etc.—now including the areas of environment and public health also.

Lastly, to understand the hierarchical character of militarization as the transfer of norms and values from the Armed Forces to the political system as a whole, we resume that “[...] throughout the period analyzed, the Army was the Force of origin of most of the posts’ occupants, there having been a decrease in the participation of the Brazilian Air Force. In the case of the Navy, the number was stable at around 20%” (Schmidt, 2022a, p. 8). Politics, thereby, must follow a chain of command organized by the principles of hierarchy, discipline, and the notion of duality between friend and foe; therefore, militarization in its character of “concentration” and “mass”, “ample front” and “great depth” demonstrates how the values of the barracks began to run the Machinery of Government. Among the military officials, we bring attention to General Heleno, who commands GSI, or the “Ministry of Ministries”.

I see in Heleno the protoplasm of this formula, and my hypothesis is that this explains, in part, the fact that he was the “off records” articulator of the boosting process of military officials into politics (part of what I, ultimately, call here hybrid warfare). Today, his position as the Government’s “strongman,” at times very explicit, being the last voice at meetings and solemnities, becomes clear. But not only that, [...] he is supported by an institutional design that makes GSI a sort of “Central” from which all government actions are, in some form, evaluated and approved—or not. (Leirner, 2020, p. 210).

Therefore, we must ask ourselves: which political group in Brazil has, in fact, effectively won all processes initiated since Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment? According to the author, no other sector has benefited more than the Armed Forces. “It is not just a matter of numerically equipping the State apparatus but also a process of hegemonic construction (that is, the imposition of values and symbols)

that places them at the center of society” (Leirner, 2020, p. 42). Resuming, this way, aspects such as the ideology of the Nation's Savior, the nation's sense of responsibility and guardianship against internal and external enemies, the ideological basis of anticommunism, the seizure of power as an expression of democracy, the advocacy of collective matters as a political party identification, etc. These are a few of the elements that made it possible for the Armed Forces to act as a “military party”, which sought to occupy the administrative sectors of the State in order to build hegemony. Thus, “[...] at the end of it all, the military project aims at the domestication of society, as its target is to transform it into as close a projection of itself as possible” (Leirner, 2020, p. 70), in other words, to militarize society as a whole.

Ergo, militarization is comprehended through its quantitative, qualitative, and hierarchical dimensions, the latter corresponding to the inner hardcore operations linked to the project of stabilization of the Armed Forces as the hegemonic power. From all that, we can state that Jair Bolsonaro led a militarized government: “a hybrid occurrence, where the hegemonic party in posts and in the program itself is the Military Party” (Penido, 2021, online). A hybrid government in which parts of the Armed Forces managed populations and territories, acting with the same purpose as the theater of operations that had been staged throughout the New Republic aiming at the seizure of power. Moreover, it deems noteworthy to mention that the Armed Forces never ceased to be a hegemonic group since military guardianship was expressed throughout the New Republic (1988-2018), above all due to autonomy granted to them in defining their own policies and world view, for not even Lula's Government (2002-2010) ever managed to influence the Armed Forces doctrines (Leirner, 2020).

However, if we understand the militarization of Jair Bolsonaro's Government, and the perception of territory as security, in that case, if the objective is the control of spatial dynamics, it is necessary to analyze such actions through Political Geography. In this way, in light of recent events, if the “spark” of discussions regarding the IEC is resumed throughout Temer's Government, it is done with a very different intentionality than the SecGov meeting of 2006. During Temer's government, the military was extended concessions, such as political privileges, financial resources, and autonomy in their operational and tactical decisions. Suffice to recollect the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro under the command of General Braga Netto, the recreation of the GSI, and the conduct that led it to become the “Ministry of Ministries” (Leirner, 2020; Monteiro, 2021). Thus, we are talking about an act of equipping the State apparatus, especially in the case of GSI, a body that has sought since 2016 to centralize under its scope both intelligence and “state security”, as well as consolidating a specific sphere of action for the military: the Critical Infrastructures.

Therefore, at the end of 2018, the National Security Policy for Critical Infrastructures (PNSIC) (Dec. 10.569/2018) is decreed with the purpose of regulating permanent attributions for the performance of the Armed Forces. The document was published after the results of the 2018 elections were known, establishing the victory of Jair Bolsonaro and Hamilton Mourão's slate. Among the PNSIC guidelines, we highlight the reinforcement of GSI's role as manager of the topic matter and the effort to bring public entities and the private sector together in order to allow them to direct actions for SIC tenders (Brasil, 2018). Furthermore, the use of the expression security draws attention, since in a context of State militarization and the Armed Forces attempt to rule territories and populations, an intentional use of the word is perceived, as it is not just about protection but also about the management of strategic structures. According to the document, critical infrastructures are “[...] facilities, services, goods, property, and systems that, if interrupted or destroyed, totally or partially, would entail a serious impact, be it social, economical, political, international, or to the security of society and the State” (Brasil, 2018, online).

We emphasize, therefore, the amplitude of the concept since the SIC would be related to the guarantee of vital services in the social, environmental, economical, political, and international sectors, or those that concern the security of society and the State. In that direction, as Bazzicalupo (2014) states, in security production models we usually fall into contexts of great uncertainty of criteria, where there is a hybridization of defense and internal security. Moreover, the document does not present an innovative methodology for the sector; it only reaffirms the best international practices with a focus on monitoring and managing information.

Withal, it is worth to underline principle “IV—safeguarding defense and national security interests” and objective “VI—establishing the override of defense and national security interests when protecting, conserving, and expanding critical infrastructures” (Brasil, 2018, online), both of which place national security as an objective and principle superior to any other. At last, the PNSIC also foresees the creation of the following instruments: a National Strategy, and a National Plan for the Security of Critical Infrastructures; both developed during Jair Bolsonaro's government within the scope of GSI and under the direction of the then Chief Minister General Augusto Heleno. Thus, it would be the Army's task to guarantee national security, especially in the, incidentally, very non-military role of managing such vital State networks within the domestic sphere.

In that respect, when we talk about the construction of GSI as the “Ministry of Ministries”, this means that the office's portfolio encompasses the responsibility for the entire intelligence and “State security” areas. The intelligence area built within the office transitioned more freely between public security and defense issues, which was exactly the window of opportunity the Army needed to put its hybrid doctrines into practice. At first, GSI was used as institutional and strategic support for

border monitoring activities, Law and Order assurance operations, and Critical Infrastructure. However, from 2018 onward, military hierarchization and centralization of political power indicate the ministry's role as national security and command chain administrator. Furthermore, on top of the possibility of direct access to federal resources, the centralization of government decisions within the intelligence system substantiates the possible reasons the Brazilian Army had for using GSI in the execution their strategic plans.

In light of that, the National Strategy for the Security of Critical Infrastructures (Ensic) (Dec. 10.569/2020) is drawn up in 2022. Among its objectives are the consolidation of concepts, the identification of the main challenges, the definition of the structural axes and strategic objectives, as well as the establishment of a reference for the Plansic formulation (Brasil, 2020). Thus, it being a methodology that must guide actions, while the PNSIC presents the political-strategic objectives of the program, Ensic seeks to consolidate its principles and guidelines, reinforcing the role of GSI and Creden as coordinators of the Technical Groups. Moreover, among providers, users, and the State, it is remarkable that civil society does not appear as a stakeholder, even though the document indicates that most of the Critical Infrastructures belong to the public sector (Brasil, 2020). In addition, we draw attention to two principles:

First, the “Cost Reduction for Society”: the argument is that services provided by these structures “support economies, governments, and societies.” Therefore, political control of the territory and the administration of service provision are ways of guaranteeing the well-being of the State and the population; objects of desire of the powers that be (Brasil, 2020).

Second, the principle of “National Defense and Security”, which states:

The preservation of political sovereignty and the defense of territorial integrity constitute fundamental elements in the definition of the national security objectives, which include the protection of the population, of the critical infrastructure, and of the essential functions of the State. In this context, the protection of critical infrastructures, developed and consolidated preventively, deserves special consideration since the referred infrastructures are fundamental elements for the country's economic development (Brasil, 2020, online).

This principle uses essentially (geo)political arguments as a justification for the SIC, in other words, a utilitarian view of the territory, which constitutes a fundamental element of the National Objectives. With that, the preservation of political sovereignty and territorial integrity must be guaranteed through the protection of the population, of the critical infrastructures, and through the

preservation of the essential functions of the State; to wit, elements such as the amplitude of the Brazilian territory, the great extension of our border lines, and the urban lifestyle of the big cities are justifications for the need to protect the SIC. Notably militarized, GSI applies geopolitical principles when making use of the discourse elements of the threatened territory that, in turn, needs to have its integrity and the safety of its population and urban areas ensured through the administration and protection of critical infrastructures.

In that regard, strategic objectives and guidelines having been established, the division of tasks was yet to be addressed. At that, the National Plan for Critical Infrastructure Security (Plansic) (Dec. 11.200/2022) was published during the election period in September 2022. In short, the Plansic takes on the responsibility of putting the SIC into action, meaning that it will seek to develop the sectorial plans (within each priority area), the division of responsibilities among the Union, states, municipalities, and society, as well as the analysis of the interdependencies. Wherefore, SIC's context is reinforced through tying access to federal funds by entities and companies of the public administration directly to the costs and future actions of its implementation (Brasil, 2022). Thus, if GSI takes on as the leading manager of the process, it leaves other agencies and entities from the private and federal public sectors to accept Union determinations and take on operating costs. On the other hand, the document also reinforces the subordination of internal public security forces, such as the police and fire departments, to the military; particularly in order to guarantee "measures of effective practical result"—i.e., the use of force, therefore, violence—in the protection of strategic assets.

Herewith, what are the intentions behind resuming the Critical Infrastructure Security program in a context of significant participation of the Armed Forces in the political arena as well as the centralization of decision-making within GSI? The answer lies within the purpose of this research, which is to investigate the connection between the geopolitical praxis and speeches of the Armed Forces as it relates to territorial defense policies during Jair Bolsonaro's government. Thereby, the Ministries responsible for implementing Plansic—the Ministry of Regional Development; the Ministry of Mines and Energy; the Ministry of Infrastructure; the Ministry of Communications; the Ministry of Economy; the Ministry of Health; and the Ministry of Defense—were the most militarized government bodies. This is not a coincidence, since it was precisely these Ministries, which had significant participation of military personnel in the commanding posts of its regulatory agencies, secretariats, and public companies, articulated within Creden that would be responsible for the SIC.

Whereupon, within the PNSIC documents, the principles of military geopolitical thought must be guaranteed through the implementation of the National Objectives, among them territory integrity.

other words, through the protection of the population, of the critical infrastructures, and the preservation of the essential functions of the State, the Armed Forces set up a justification which, supported by essentializing physical and human geography, positions State reasoning, and by extension, politics, at the service of the military strategy (Ó Tuathail, Dalby & Routledge, 2003; Guzzini, 2020). Thus, disposing of discourse elements based on the premise of territory as security encompasses a geographical ideology that calls the Armed Forces to take on the authority to guarantee the security of urban areas and populations through the protection and administration of Critical Infrastructures. We establish this premise based on military geopolitical thought as well as the analysis of the discourse present in documents (Silva, 1981). However, Geography and its knowledge may also contribute to reaching these conclusions. In that regard, it is interesting to observe, in Brazil's case, “[...] a tendency to concentrate military forces where political power was concentrated” (Carvalho, 2019, p. 56), that is, in spaces that allow for political control of the territory.

Figure 1: Brazil's Strategic Terrestrial Structures



Source: Brasil, 2021, p. 24.

Thereby, in the words of Demeterco (2011, p. 13):

Upon the presentation of the different existing infrastructures and observing the map, where most of the existing infrastructures located in national territory are gathered, the question remains: Which are the critical infrastructures? Which are the ones that require a “closer look” from the State? These questions must be answered based on a methodology that could give scientific support to a project that would bring betterment to Brazil’s infrastructures, rather than through empirical experiments.

According to Figure 1, with special attention to the Energy, Transport, Communications, and the so-called “Center of Political Power,” these are Brazil’s Critical Infrastructures, as identified in 2012 by national monitoring system built and implemented by the Army in partnership with GSI/PR. Whereas, based on reading the figure, most of these structures are located on the Brazilian shore and in the South and Southeast regions. However, we underline reading the CI we sought to identify the vital chains, the most critical infrastructures; therefore, five workgroups and twelve subgroups were created in the areas of Water, Transport, Communication, Energy, and Finance. In this way, “[...] 276 Strategic Territorial Structures were added to GSI/PR’s Institutional Security Mosaic 368, coming to a total of 644.” (Brasil, 2013)

In that aspect, if from 2016 onward Brazil will face a context of economic crises and public spending restriction, due to that a series of Army programs will also face cut-offs and budget reductions, which had not been foreseen in the initial planning, hindering its execution. The PROTEGER program is an example of this context.

Thus, among the characteristics of the Brazilian program, despite most of the CIs (IC) being under the control of the public sector (Rodrigues et al., 2018), the Government did not stimulate a process of building a culture around the protection of these vital chains, nor did it stimulate a larger involvement by the private sector, the academy, or civil society in the discussion. Thereby, despite best international practices indicating a division of tasks among the interested parties, among the operators and owners of the CIs (IC), in Brazil, this process was done from the “top down,” leaving it up to the private sector to assume most of the operational costs. In that regard, 3 elements stand out and differentiate the Brazilian experience from the others that were also analyzed. Firstly, most of the CI (IC) belong to and are exploited by the public sector. Secondly, there was a centralization of risks within the judicial and regulatory frameworks of public power, to the detriment of private actors and civil society, especially as it regards the Army's performance in the development of the legislation as well as the choice of methodology and the implementation of the programs. Thirdly, except for the Chilean Program (2023), no other neighboring country developed a national project, and even in the

produced legislation itself, the Brazilian military did not consider the importance of a trans-border perspective to the program.

And, in light of the events of Jair Bolsonaro’s government, we can state that if the discussion regarding the CI (IC) is resumed along the term of Temer’s government, it was under a rather different intentionality from the SecGov 2006 meeting. Therefore, we think of Critical Infrastructure as a territorial system, meaning the crystallizations of these vital networks within physical space, i.e., circulation and communication networks; energy production, transmission, and distribution systems; water storage and distribution systems; etc., in short, engineering systems that grant the reproduction of the industrial-urban lifestyle, as Santos and Silveira (2020) would state. Thus, we emphasize that these strategic structures are intentionally chosen based on a specific methodology that points out vital networks and areas. And in Brazil’s case, we reinforce that the military sees security as an ongoing managerial matter. For this reason, the intentionality of the security discourse that justifies practices well located within the territory must be taken into consideration. Based on the information-set taken from the material entitled “Registration of Inland Strategic Structures (*Cadastro de Estruturas Estratégicas Terrestres* in Portuguese), we understand that Brazil has 644 strategic structures (Brasil, 2013) according to the Army and GSI. Thus, in order to think about territorial practices, if IECs are territorial networks unevenly distributed throughout the territory as well, we propose to regionalize them according to Brazil’s five macro-regions defined as: North; Northeast; Midwest; Southeast; and South (Silva, 2021b). Ergo, as seen on Table 1, we found new strategic contours for the Critical Infrastructures.

Table 1: Distribution of Critical Infrastructures as it regards total population and metropolitan municipalities


Brazil and Regions	Number of Critical Infrastructures	Distribution of Brazilian population by regions in 2019	Municipalities created and installed up to 2020	Distribution of Brazilian metropolitan municipalities in 2020	Percentage regarding the country’s total area	Percentage regarding the country’s total Critical Infrastructures
North	87	8.8%	449	45	45.25%	13.51%
Midwest	108	7.8%	446	56	18.87%	16.77%
Northeast	152	27.2%	1,787	123	18.24%	23.6%
Southeast	199	42.1%	1,666	196	10.86%	30.9%
South	98	14.3%	1,159	107	6.78%	15.22%
Brazil	644	100%	5,507	527	100%	100%

Source: Brasil, 2013; Silva, 2021b; Del Prette, 2022.

Table 1 was developed by the authors of this article according to the sources found in Brasil (2013), Silva (2021b), and Del Prette (2022). The IECs unequal distribution throughout national territory stands out, wherein it becomes noticeable that approximately 70% of them are located in the Southeast, South, and Northeast regions, covering an area equivalent to 35.88% of the national territory. Moreover, it is worth outlining the division of the 644 (100%) IECs into strategic areas: transportation 277 (35.25%); energy 222 (34.47%); communication 80 (12.42%); water 80 (12.42%); nuclear 6 (0.94%); and other 29 (4.5%) (Brasil, 2013, online).

If we think in terms of population, 86% of the Brazilian people live in municipalities and metropolitan municipalities, specifically in 4,612 municipalities (83.74% of the total) and in 426 metropolitan municipalities (representing 80.83% of the Brazilian total), respectively. Moreover, “[...] approximately 85% of the Brazilian metropolitan population is established in municipalities within the metropolitan areas of the capitals. Brazil’s largest metropolitan population groups are located in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraná” (Del Prette, 2022, p.173-174). Hence, the distribution of critical infrastructures follows in Figure 2 (Brasil, 2013).

Figure 2: Critical Infrastructures within Brazilian territory



Thus, the map demonstrates that continuously managing Critical Infrastructures is a way to guarantee political control over the territory as well as access to its assets—especially its demographical masses—as set forth by such technical-political and urban-industrial networks. Furthermore, although the Amazon came to be considered the main territory to be defended at least 30 years ago, more than 70% of the military manpower in Brazil remained under the Southern and Southeastern Commands (Monteiro, 2021). The implementation of the SIC program would reinforce the trend since the South, Southeast, and Northeast regions are home to almost 70% of the structures considered strategic.

Considering this, Raffestin (1993) states that the main objective of the exercise of power is the control of circulation and of demographic masses, yet in the context of such military operations, when politics and reason of state are at the service of military strategy, controlling populations, and transportation, communication, or energy networks, etc. take on new contours. In short, discourses pointing to territory as security, as well as the need to guarantee National Objectives, are also self-fulfilling prophecies, wherein the solution is found in military tutelage and the domestication of society by the Armed Forces. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the protection of populations, critical infrastructures, urban environments, and essential functions of the State are justifications that appear in Ensic's national security and defense principles.

Furthermore, since the reformulation of the military doctrine in the 1990s, the Armed Forces follow a logic of preparing for internal combat; according to Saint-Pierre (1993), the Army states, in military manuals, that it should occupy urban and rural strategic areas and have troops ready to restore peace and internal order in case of social instability. Thus, as stated by Monteiro (2021), a large contingent of troops should remain in urban centers, acting as reinforcement of the idea of conceiving the urban space as war territory. Hence, if “[...] the country's large population masses are concentrated in a few medium-sized municipalities and metropolitan areas” (Del Prette, 2022, p. 168), it is precisely in these places that the desires of power are found. This is an indication that upholds, especially in Brazil's case, since the control of just a few cities is condition enough to seize control of national resources. Ergo, contributions by Political Geography point out that political power is territorial, and therefore, territory control results from the creation of spaces of command and spaces of performance—organized according to the strategies of the different actors that are in the position to establish the hierarchy of access to assets—be the territory seen as opportunity or as security (Gottmann, 1973; Santos & Silveira, 2020).

Moreover, we correlate Critical Infrastructures to an Armed Forces geopolitical project of internal applications, therefore not a novelty in the country's history. Thus, when we return to the ideas of General Golbery do Couto e Silva, we think about the proximity it has to his geopolitical

discourses—widely studied by the Brazilian military—and how they may help in understanding the initiative of territorial political control and the SIC project. To this effect, in the name of safeguarding democracy against corruption, communism, the Workers' Party, globalism, organized crime, NGOs, etc.—although there are no lack of threats to the territory—the long-term objective becomes to maintain military tutelage and build an Armed Forces hegemonic project, resuming the geopolitical maneuver of territorial national integration. To that effect, what better operation to place the military in strategic spaces than that of Critical Infrastructures? Ergo, when military geopolitics—in the form of territorial discourses about and directed to power—highlights policies based on a zonal configuration of the national political administration, it represents, simultaneously, a political, a military, and, specifically, a territorial instrument of power. This way, through geographic elements such as Space and Position, transportation and communication networks, as well as flux control, are necessary elements to guarantee political control over the territory, i.e., the construction of certain territorial systems in order to appropriate assets and enable the governing of things (Silva, 1981). For this reason, placing the military within the State is not enough; analyzing these strategies within a war context is deemed necessary since controlling the masses and what they think is essential. Whereupon, geopolitics today informs us that the economy of power is found within urban logistics and spaces.

Conclusion:

When we question the reasons that led the Armed Forces to engage in composing the group exercising governmental power, as well as the conflicts involved in this process, we find these questions might be partially answered by our hypotheses: a) The Brazilian Armed Forces thinks about the maintenance of territorial political control, especially in recurrent periods of State militarization and permanent pursuit of National Objectives; and b) Critical Infrastructures represent part of the Brazilian Armed Forces strategic objectives in order to guarantee the maintenance of political control over the territory.

In that aspect, analyzing the territory as security allows for the understanding of a conjecture of geography itself, as Jean Gottmann would say, moving from a more fluid order to territorial contention order in the political discourses and practices. In our work, if territory as security tends to seek control of circulation and flux—serving as a shelter—thus, it represents an imagery of security that results from the rebirth of a certain geopolitical discourse. Ergo, there is an understanding that the SIC program and the recent militarization of the Brazilian State must be thought of in conjunction since the political control of the territory is part of the military project in order to govern populations and exercise guardianship of the territories. For that, we point to the assemblage of a tripod that involves the Law-and-Order Assurance Operations, the monitoring of borders, and the SIC program.

Consequently, well-known military geopolitical principles must be granted through the carrying-out of the National Objectives present in documents associated with the National Policy for the Security of Critical Infrastructures. In such, having discursive elements that derive from the assumption of a threatened territory and, therefore, of territory as security, comprises a geographic ideology that calls on the Armed Forces to assume power and guarantee the security of populations and urban areas through the management of strategic structures. In addition, we may correlate Critical Infrastructures and the use of this territorial system of weaves, knots, and networks, while an Armed Forces geopolitical project of internal applications, to the geopolitical maneuver of national territorial integration.

With that in mind, we may state that the theme of Critical Infrastructures, in the way it was conceived, represents a territorial system that gives access to assets, and, in that sense, its management and control are ways of carrying out the governing of things, of populations, and of circulation systems within the territory. Therefore, analyzing geographical discourses is to put its contents into perspective, that is, the “geographical thinking” that is present, hidden, and revealed through these communication tools. Being, for example, Critical Infrastructures or other territorial systems, these crystallizations do not merely concern strategies and past applications, whereas if Geography intends to deal with current territorial dynamics, it also needs to address the new use of geopolitics by actors such as the Brazilian Armed Forces—actors that still produce their own discourses in favor of their very well-placed own interests. For this reason, studying territory as security also serves as a warning to Brazilian Political Geography; a warning regarding the need to salvage the political concept of territory.

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