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SPACIALITIES AND RHETORICS OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 2018 BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

*Espacialidades e retóricas
de soberania: a eleição
presidencial brasileira 2018*

*Espacialidades y retóricas de
la soberanía: las elecciones
presidenciales brasileñas de 2018*



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Abstract: The relationship between State and territory has been a pillar in Political Geography since its foundation as a subfield of Geography, and it offers a way of translating sovereignty into a spatial concept. Based on the important contribution of John Agnew in *Globalization and Sovereignty* (2018) and different articles published after his germinal article in 1994, this paper seeks to corroborate that territory is a possible way to consider the spatial dimension of sovereignty, but it is not the only one. To this end, this article uses Iramuteq software to analyze twelve hours of the discourse related to sovereignty in 2018 Brazilian Superior Electoral Court (TSE) judgment on the attempted candidacy of former president Lula da Silva. This paper argues that geopolitics is constructed with various rhetorical frameworks concerning sovereignty, according to contemporaneous national and international political contexts. This paper demonstrates the discourse on sovereignty allows and creates the conditions for the spatial exercise of power.

Keywords: sovereignty; territory; rhetoric of sovereignty; spatiality dimension of sovereignty; State.

Resumo: A relação entre Estado e território tem sido um pilar da Geografia Política desde sua fundação como subárea da Geografia, e oferece uma forma de pensar a soberania em um conceito espacial. Com base na importante contribuição de John Agnew em *Globalization and Sovereignty* (2018) e em diversos artigos publicados após seu artigo germinal em 1994, este artigo busca corroborar que o território é uma forma possível de considerar a dimensão espacial da soberania, mas não é a única. Para tanto, este artigo utiliza o software Iramuteq para analisar doze horas do discurso relacionado à soberania no julgamento do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) de 2018 sobre a tentativa de candidatura do ex-presidente Lula da Silva. Este artigo argumenta que a geopolítica é construída com vários quadros retóricos sobre a soberania, de acordo com os contextos políticos nacionais e internacionais contemporâneos. Este artigo demonstra que o discurso sobre a soberania permite e cria as condições para o exercício espacial do poder político.

Palavras-chave: soberania; território; retórica da soberania; dimensão espacialidade da soberania; Estado.

Resumen: La relación entre Estado y territorio ha sido un pilar de la Geografía Política desde su fundación como subcampo de la Geografía, y ofrece una forma de traducir la soberanía en un concepto espacial. Con base en la importante contribución de John Agnew en *Globalization and Sovereignty* (2018) y diferentes artículos publicados después de su artículo germinal en 1994, este trabajo busca corroborar que el territorio es una forma posible de considerar la dimensión espacial de la soberanía, pero no es única. Con este fin, este artículo utiliza el software Iramuteq para analizar doce horas del discurso relacionado con la soberanía en la sentencia del Tribunal Superior Electoral (TSE) de Brasil de 2018 sobre el intento de candidatura del expresidente Lula da Silva. Este artículo argumenta que la geopolítica se construye con diversos marcos retóricos sobre la soberanía, de acuerdo con los contextos políticos nacionales e internacionales contemporâneos. Este artículo demuestra que el discurso sobre la soberanía permite y crea las condiciones para el ejercicio espacial del poder.

Palabras clave: soberanía; territorio; retórica de la soberanía; dimensión espacial de la soberanía; Estado.

INTRODUCTION

The last few years have been marked by the rise of politicians who run on platforms characterized by a discourse of anti-globalization. In general, there are two avenues by which these politicians argue against globalization: the politico-cultural and the economic. From the politico-cultural perspective, politicians argue that ideals of human rights spread via supranational institutions (e.g., the United Nations) conflict with national values (Regime Jr, 2019). From the economic perspective, they argue that the construction of global networks of economic activity suppresses state power (Arredondo, 2020). The electoral discourses of Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil overlapped in their blunt criticism of what they called “globalism”. According to their philosophies, “globalism” is an ideology promoted by groups intent on weakening the nation-state¹, undermining its power and national culture in support of global values. For subscribers to this world view, globalism is the ideology of the globalization process.

Ironically, the argument that a global network can trigger the dismantling of the nation-state is visible on both the left and the right sides of the political spectrum. On one hand, scholars who use Marxist structuralism as an epistemological basis understand globalization to be the way in which the capitalist economic system supplants the welfare state via multinationals and financial institutions, deepening inequalities and increasing global financial values (see, for example, Santos 2000). On the other hand, conservatives criticize what they call “ultraliberalism”, an ideology that argue undermines national values and, consequently, puts the national social fabric at risk (see, for example, Scruton 2019). On the left and the right, the concept of sovereignty linked to the territorial state is used as a rhetorical counterargument to globalization as it is currently understood.

This article proposes to revisit this concept of sovereignty, using the denial of former president Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s candidacy for the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections as the object of analysis. The central argument is that the idea of sovereignty is also used as political rhetoric, sometimes being associated with Westphal’s classical concept of territory, and sometimes being associated with a more globalist view. Thus, based on a case study of an emblematic moment in contemporary Brazilian politics, I argue that the request of the candidate’s defense to the United Nations to intercede with Brazilian institutions and the subsequent denial of this request by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) can be analyzed through the lens of sovereignty. The qualitative methodology was carried out with Iramuteq software to analyze 12 hours of speech in the trial and available online. Using the second edition of John Agnew’s book *Globalization and Sovereignty* (2018) and different articles on the subject published after the author’s germinal article on this subject in 1994 (Agnew, 1994), I analyzed the spatial dimension of sovereignty beyond the traditional relationship with the territory, revealing the different modalities of sovereignty that are activated in different geopolitical circumstances.

1 President Jair Bolsonaro, even when he was still a candidate, always made clear the influence of Olavo de Carvalho’s philosophy on his ideas. The Brazilian philosopher is one of the main conservative thinkers against “globalism”. One such example is the Carvalho’s 2017 online class, viewable at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ljMzwAo0b64>. Accessed October 14, 2019.

This article illustrates how the rhetoric of sovereignty is used in different international and national contexts to support the political objectives of national actors and institutions. Therefore, as sovereignty is flexibly employed in political rhetoric, the concept of sovereignty must also be flexibly understood. In other words, there are multiple modalities of sovereign spatiality driven primarily by political objectives.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER LUÍS INÁCIO LULA DA SILVA'S CANDIDACY IN THE 2018 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN – THE CASE IN POINT

On August 15th, 2018, the Workers' Party (PT) announced its candidate for that year's presidential elections, former President, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva. Despite having been president for two consecutive terms (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), the decision to run again after an eight-year break would not have been controversial except for one reason: the candidate had been arrested by Federal Police² in the city of Curitiba in April of that year.


The arrest came after Lula had been condemned in appellate court³ to 12 years and 1 month in prison for the crimes of money laundering and corruption. While this was unfolding, PT had been waiting until the last possible day to confirm his candidacy alongside Fernando Haddad (ex-mayor of São Paulo) as his vice-president. Along with the announcement, Lula published a "Letter to the Brazilian people" in which he denounced these charges as political persecution perpetrated by the opposition. According to his supporters, the judgments made by Federal Prosecutors (*Ministério Público*) and the two convictions (first by the Federal Judge, Sérgio Moro, then by appeal judges in the city of Porto Alegre) were part of a larger scheme to remove him from the 2018 presidential election.

The crimes of corruption and money laundering are related to the well-known *Lava-Jato* operation⁴, which began in 2014 and extends to the present day. Politicians from across the country's largest parties were investigated, especially in Progressive Party (PP), followed by Workers Party (PT) and Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB, now MDB). In April 2018, the investigation reached Lula, who was then the front-runner

2 The Federal Police in Brazil have almost the same functions of FBI in the United States.

3 The Brazilian Judiciary system is divided in two levels. On level one, a defendant can be first, one can be convicted by a single judge in a "monocratic" decision. If the defendant does not agree with the decision, it is possible to appeal to level two: a group of judges. In this case, the second level must uphold or reject the decision of the first level judge. If this group of judges also finds the defendant guilty, the ruling is commonly known as being "convicted in the second level". In practice, this means that the only way to avoid or be released from prison is to appeal to the Supreme Court (if the appeal argues that the decisions were unconstitutional) or to Supreme Court of Justice (if the appeal is based on factors unrelated to constitutionality of the decision).

4 *Operação Lava Jato* is the biggest anti-corruption investigation in Brazilian history. Many high-level politicians were convicted, including senators, congressmen, and governors. Billions of dollars were returned to the State and even political leaders outside Brazil (such as four former presidents of Peru) were investigated and condemned in their own countries because of *Lava Jato*. Nevertheless, although it is a landmark anti-corruption investigation, many citizens and political parties view the investigation as having been a politically motivated project, as Lula claimed in his "Letter to the Brazilian People".



in the 2018 presidential election polls and the most popular former president since the return of representative democracy in Brazil in 1988.

Convicted at the appellate level, Lula was incriminated by a law that, ironically, he himself had sign it into law when he was still president: the Clean Record Law (*Lei da Ficha Limpa*). Enacted in 2010 as a result of a popular initiative, the law transformed the eligibility rules, preventing a person from running for political office if he/she had been convicted of a crime by a judicial group, which was exactly what happened in his failed appeal attempt in Porto Alegre. Thus, it was only a matter of time before the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) had to decide on Lula's eligibility for presidential candidacy.

However, before this trial, the former president's defense team filed another special request to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, through the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (signed by Brazil in 1991) and its Additional Protocol – whose text allows individuals to submit requests directly to the Committee (signed in 2009). According to the defense team of the former president, the ban on his candidacy would violate Articles 9 and 14 and Items 1, 2 and 17 of the Pact, which deal with the political rights of individuals. Then, on August 17th, 2018, the Committee accepted the injunction request and issued a letter with its decision agreeing with Lula's defense team to the Brazilian legal entities.

The TSE trial started on August 31st and lasted until September 1st, 2018. The TSE decided by a vote of six to one that Lula could not run for the office of the president of Brazil again, stating, in the vast majority, that the UN Human Rights Commission's decision is not binding on Brazilian institutions. A dispute of legal interpretations ensued. On one side, lawyers and different politicians supported the TSE decision and legitimized the prohibition of Lula's candidature. On the other, many politicians and supporters of the ex-president argued that the conviction was nothing more than an unjust and anti-democratic political move.

Far from being a simple judicial decision, I argue that this complex case helps us to understand how the sovereignty is employed both rhetorically and conceptually in Brazil, when different discourses – both supporting and opposing international intervention – are used to support political objectives within Brazilian territory and politics. To ground this discussion, in the next section, I revisit the concept of sovereignty and its historical relationship with territory and then explore Agnew's analysis, which increases the complexity of the relationship between geographic space and sovereignty. Then, I explore discussions by different authors – all inspired by Agnew's work – whose theoretical and empirical contributions helped to further develop the debate. Finally, I return to and analyze the TSE's judgment on the ex-president's candidacy eligibility through the lens of the sovereignty debate, ultimately arguing that geopolitics is built on a different rhetoric of sovereignty. My conclusion agrees with Reid-Henry (2010:753), that “we must also take into account how *ideas* about the state are themselves an element of state construction”.

SOVEREIGNTY – THE IMPORTANCE OF A DEBATE

Sovereignty and Its Classic Relationship With Territory

Often taken as a fact, in actuality, the concept of sovereignty needs to be constantly in debate in order to avoid naturalizations that obscure its intrinsically political character. Sovereignty is a basic concept of Political Geography – in the relationship between sovereignty and territory, geographers illustrate the spatiality of the State's political power.

The historical landmark brought by most of the authors – both political philosophers and 20th century geographers alike – is the Peace of Westphalia, a set of peace treaties in the 17th century signed after the Thirty Years' War. The Westphalian peace is conceived as “a fundamental landmark of the secular system of interactions and modern state principles, such as territorial sovereignty, non-interference in the domestic politics of other states and tolerance between political units endowed with equal rights” (Jesus, 2010, p.222). As such, the myth of political independence and corresponding territorial integrity of the State has its foundational landmark in Westphalia. Saskia Sassen (2006) stated that the Westphalian system defined sovereignty as the right of the State to regulate within a space that is territorially bounded by two types of authority: internal sovereignty, which requires the citizen's recognition of the State's legitimacy, and external or international sovereignty, which requires international recognition of the State's legitimacy to govern free of interference by actors outside its territory.

This apparently intrinsic relationship between territory and sovereignty was established across the political philosophy spectrum – from defenders of the monarchical-religious principle to defenders of the popular-territorial principle. However, one can argue that it isn't until Jean Bodin's pioneering work on sovereignty that it becomes a concept all its own (Maritain, 1950; Lloyd, 2017). For Bodin, sovereignty was linked to monarchical absolutism and to the figure of the Prince, unlike the more contemporary conception that removes the monarch's state sovereignty and brings it closer to its respective territory. This idea is also echoed in the voices of Hobbes and Machiavelli, who, (although the former differed from Bodin in his definition of the source of sovereignty), all associated sovereignty with the monarch.

It was in John Locke's work that the principle of territoriality became more evident, moving away from the idea of “political body” linked to the Prince and toward a metaphor about the territory over which the State has jurisdiction. The liberal defense that the State's function is to safeguard individuals from internal and external aggression, private property, life, and freedom, has made John Locke a great defender of closed political communities in territories with well-defined borders, with necessarily shared cultural attributes for the people to exercise their sovereignty (Agnew, 2018). The doctrine of “popular sovereignty”, endorsed by Locke and Rousseau, conceives “the people” as a territorial community, defined by the State (Kuss; Agnew, 2009). This doctrine that associates sovereignty to the territory, and the population to the State is, even today, one of the pillars of the concept (Yack, 2001).

Thus, security and national identity (often taken as prior to the formation of the State) are two mechanisms used to justify the idea of national sovereignty, since the very formation of modern States, whose process in Europe had the war against an external enemy as its main argument (Herbst, 1990; Fukuyama, 2013). The dichotomous construction we/they, mainly from the fear of external military intervention, was fundamental for the construction of the idea of State.

More recently, Bodin's and Hobbes's notions of sovereignty as unlimited power has been re-interpreted as exclusive and independent power, mainly since the advent of the nation-state and mass democracy. It was the territory that made it possible to ensure the effectiveness and stability of sovereignty and, consequently, of the modern State itself, becoming, for the main political theorists, an indispensable element for the existence of the state (Bobbio, 2000). For Longo (2017, p.4) "these three attributes – territory, autonomy and independence – together comprise what we commonly call sovereignty". Hudson (1998, p.89) pointed out that "sovereignty, the bundling of rule-making authority within bounded territories, is the hallmark of the modern international political economy".

This link between territory and sovereignty can also be seen in the most well-known and used definition of the State, the one that Max Weber established as being "a relationship of men dominating men, a relationship maintained through legitimate violence (that is, considered legitimate). It is a human community that successfully seeks a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1964, p.158). In other words, the sovereignty of the State in Weber's analysis was the territorial organization of political authority. As Elden (2010) and Shah (2012) have already pointed out, the concepts of territory and State took center stage in political discourse together: "the relationship between the two was mutually constitutive" (Shah, 2012, p.62).

In different textbooks of Political Geography, one can see the supposedly intrinsic relationship between State and territory (Glassner; Blij, 1967; Nogué, 2006; Dahlman, 2009; Painter; Jeffrey, 2009; Vesentini, 2010). As Smith stated,

We are used to mapping and interpreting our political world based on the theory of sovereignty, which holds that it is the political community of the State that exercises supreme authority over a given territorial jurisdiction and that is the most appropriate image of how the political space should be organized, demarcated and, for much of Political Geography, theorized (Smith, 1996, p.66).

As for John Locke, the obsession with the idea of security as a function of the modern state made J. Gottmann limit the spatiality of the state to the idea of territory, in the well-known debate about territory as a shelter and as a resource. In an important article, Gottmann argued that "territory is a portion of the geographic space that coincides with the spatial extension of a government's jurisdiction" (Gottmann, 1975, p.29) and is politically organized through a conflict between *forces of circulation* and *forces of iconography* (Gottmann, 1973). Many authors use this theoretical basis to interpret the tension between current patterns in globalization and the perpetuation of territorial State. In other words, the

forces of circulation, intensified by sophisticated communication and transport networks that would undermine the territoriality of the State, are restrained by the forces of iconography (systems of signs by which men's minds organize themselves, like nationalism).

Added to Gottman's ideas, we can add the work of Michael Mann who, despite being a sociologist, is an author widely used by political geographers to debate the relationship between state, sovereignty, and territory. It is in the territorial centrality that Mann (1993) finds the source of the autonomy of the State's power in the relationship between despotic power and infrastructural power. The first refers to the power related to the "Prince", that is, the governmental capacity to enforce laws. The second, which interests me more here, defines the State's ability to penetrate civil society and implement actions throughout its territory through its own infrastructure, such as the existence, for example, of police stations, courts, schools, and other fixed elements in space. As Agnew (2018) argued, the infrastructural power, whose expansion took place from the 19th century, was largely responsible for the territorialization of sovereignty, from the moment when the demand for public services fostered the expansion of the State throughout the space considered "yours".

This conception of sovereignty linked to the national territory was reflected in the countless analyses of the loss of power of the nation-state in the globalization process (Becker, 1988; Ohmae, 1996; Santos, 2000; Flint; Taylor, 2000). Ironically, Shah (2012) points out that when authors discuss the erosion of borders by the globalization movement, they end up corroborating the "territorial trap". These authors argue that before the height of globalization, there was a state with full sovereignty over its territory (generally, the post-World War II Keynesian state) and in the current phase of globalization (usually associated with neoliberalism) the sovereignty of the nation-state has become increasingly jeopardized by the economic, political, and cultural flows that cross its territorial jurisdiction. As Newman (2010) points out, for a long time, territory was linked to an idea of compartmentalization of space in a fixed way, with clear and well-defined limits.

However, as Fall (2010) demonstrates, the equalization of ethnicity and nationality implies that both are natural and given, generating tragic consequences when transformed into political solutions. This classical geographic conception of sovereignty and territory is widely read among authors outside geography, focusing the contribution of this discipline on distance studies, definition of boundaries, and cartography (Fall, 2000).

We agree with John Agnew in stating that the Westphalian myth of sovereignty represents, perhaps, the ideal, but not the practice. His book *Globalization and Sovereignty*, first published in 2009, but which in 2018 had a second edition (largely transformed by the current political events in the world), has the merit of bringing together the author's own discussion raised in 1994 in his article published in the journal, *International Political Economy*. After 1994, different authors deepened this debate (Cox *et al*, 2008), with major theoretical and empirical contributions, "shifting to more ambiguous spatial arrangements or 'gray' zones through which sovereign power operates and is produced" (Mountz, 2013, p.1).

Revisiting the arguments of *Globalization and Sovereignty* by John Agnew and further debates

Almost 30 years ago, Agnew (1994) published an article that would have a significant impact on discussions about the spatiality of sovereignty. Years later, in the first edition of his book, *Globalization and Sovereignty*, he deepened the initial argument. The second edition of the book in 2018 demonstrated how the debate is still current, especially since the election campaigns of presidents around the world who routinely use the concept of sovereignty in their speeches. The book brings together a series of arguments that the author built over years of research about the “territorial trap” and “sovereignty regimes”. I agree with Reid-Henry (2010, p.752) “the territorial trap offers a critique of geopolitical thinking which remains relevant today as it draws attention to the continued need to think very carefully about the ways in which the claims of state sovereignty and national security are mobilized in our geopolitical present”.

John Agnew, in *Globalization and Sovereignty* (2018), disagrees with the majority interpretation of sovereignty among political geographers, evading what he called a “territorial trap”. If, as Agnew said, the Westphalian myth of territorial sovereignty was never entirely valid, today its exclusive use would no longer make sense. In his view, sovereignty needs to be seen more as something constructed from the circulation of power between different actors and dispersed points than simply emanating from a central point of command and power abstractly called “State”.

The greatest contribution of the book, according to the author himself, is the revelation that States were never really the powerful and autonomous actors that they were understood to be in the arguments of political philosophers and geographers outlined above. By demystifying the relationship, viewed as virtually almost natural between territory and sovereignty, Agnew illustrated that sovereignty has always been “divided” between various actors, domestic and international. This means that the “intrusion” of external agents in the sovereignty of Brazil or of any country is not a new phenomenon of contemporary globalization, rather, it has always existed but in different forms. If this is a true and accurate understanding of the complexity of sovereignty, then the widespread idea of the “Westphalian state” is mythical rather than jurisprudentially precise. John Agnew is emphatic in saying that there has never been a state that has exercised total political or economic-regulatory monopoly over its territories and, therefore, globalization does not suspend or weaken sovereignty, rather, it just complicates the relationship between sovereignty and geographical space.

The book thus develops the concept of *effective sovereignty*, using the statements Agnew had already used in his 1994 article, i.e., stating that a state necessarily participates in one or multiple sovereignty regimes, whose combination of central state authority and geographical space can be quite different from one other. If we rely on Agnew’s arguments, then we must abandon the traditional conception of the geography of power, which is based on three assumptions: first, States have exclusive power within their territories represented by the idea of sovereignty; second, “domestic” and “external” relationships

are essentially separate branches with different rules; and, third, the borders of the State define the borders of society, as if the latter were contained in the former. These three assumptions reinforce the state-centrist perspective of power, which Agnew calls the “territorial trap”. Thus, sovereignty can be seen as the locus of several social powers, including many beyond the limitations of the state’s control. Agreeing with Agnew’s assumption, Steinberg (2009) in his research on “between worlds” pointed out that binary oppositions embedded in the sociospatial logic of the sovereign make no sense when we think about how those territorializations are built.

The current debates on environmental issues, the global economy, the refugee crisis, citizens with multiple citizenship, the dissemination of knowledge, relations between university centers, terrorism networks, and organized crime – all of these phenomena demonstrate how the concept of sovereignty based on territory is nonsensical. If it did make sense, it would negate the legitimacy of supranational courts, such as Hague Tribunal, and international agreements, such as the UN Civil and Political Rights Pact, the case in point of this paper’s analysis.


Sovereignty, instead, could be understood as a set of regimes “geographically organized in different ways depending on a mixture of central state authority and levels of territoriality associated with it” (Agnew, 2018, p.128), Agnew’s central to this discussion. With an approach that he called “geosociological”, Agnew constructed a typology that illustrated the complexities of sovereignty by emphasizing the way in which the State is produced at the same time materially and discursively over space, although with powers that are always limited and shared. The typology constructed by the author was based on the two basic dimensions discussed by Michael Mann, that is, the relative strength of the central authority of the State (despotic power) and the axis of consolidation of state territoriality (infrastructural power). While “the first involves judging the extent to which it has acquired and maintained an effective and legitimate rule making apparatus”, the second “refers to the degree to which the provision of public goods and the operation of markets are strongly regulated by the State and territorially delimited” (Agnew, 2018, p.161). Agnew’s four sovereignty regimes are elaborated as follows:

Table 1 – Regimes of sovereignty

Territoriality of the State		
Central Authority of the State	Consolidated	Open
Strong	Classic	Globalist
Weak	Integrated	Imperialist

Source: Agnew, 2018.

The “classical” would be the closest case to the Westphalian idea of sovereignty, that is, both despotic and infrastructural powers are used within the State’s territory, with high effectiveness of its central authority. The “imperialist” model would emphasize the idea that there would be a hierarchy of sovereignty in the world, where networks would



increasingly supplement or take the place of direct territorial control. In this case, the central authority of the State is jeopardized by external dependence and internal challenges (such as corruption) and the territoriality of the State would be the target of separatist threats. The “integrated” regime concerns the coexistence of different layers of government, with sharing of despotic and infrastructural power. Finally, the fourth regime, “globalist”, would be the one in which there would be a greater number of non-territorial mechanisms of power. Whether England in the 19th century or the United States today, this type of sovereignty would be experienced by States that seek hegemony on a global scale with an open territoriality, but also with strong central authority. It is important to note that the central idea of John Agnew’s book is to demonstrate that States do not just exercise one sovereignty regime, but rather a profound complexity of the four types.

It is important to emphasize that Agnew’s work has had important repercussions since 1994, and different articles related to the theme were produced. The works of Stephen Krasner (1999) and Bob Jessop (2015) have made the idea of sovereignty and territory more complex. Jessop (2015, p.49), for example, stated that “the state may be defined as ‘a specific institutional ensemble with multiple boundaries, no institutional fixity and no pre-given formal or substantive unity’”. Glassman (1999) advances the discussion brought up by Agnew by pointing out that sovereignty is an uneven process of internationalization, which can be counteracted by various forces at particular points in time. It is in this sense that Sidaway (2013) said it would be better off thinking in layers by topologies of sovereignty “that fold and stretch in different directions producing territory as well as being variegated” (Sidaway, 2013, p.963). In the same way, Caspersen (2012) points out the coexistence of a wide variety of sovereign arrangements.

A few years after Agnew’s paper, Hudson (1998) used his idea of territorial trap and developed the idea of regulatory landscapes to think about the spatiality of rules and the activities which the rules seek to regulate. He suggests that international political economy in some ways resembles the physical landscape: a landscape of places and actors, which is reshaped by actors within it, at the same time as the actors’ behavior is shaped by the existing landscape. According to Hudson, regulatory landscapes are organized in terms of two dimensions or axes: the degree of boundedness of economic activity and the degree of boundedness of political regulation. Each of these axes stretch from bounded to trans-boundary poles. ‘Bounded’ economic activity refers to the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities within a defined territory, for instance the state, while trans-boundary economic activity refers to situations where commodity flows across (state) borders.

In volume 15, issue 4, the journal *Geopolitics* (2010), authors were called to discuss the relevance, virtues and limits of Agnew’s discussion of territorial trap. Different researchers began to demonstrate how sovereignty does not necessarily adhere to the national territory imagined on the political map, whether they are still linked to the State, such as enclaves (Berger, 2010), exclaves (Falah, 2003), military bases (Davis, 2011), or “geopolitical anomalies” (McConnell, 2010); whether those linked to spatialities generally marginalized in literature, such as jails (the prison at Guantanamo is one of the most

cited examples) (Gregory, 2006). In these territories, the authors emphasize how the law does not apply, that is, the traditional rules of sovereignty are suspended.

To summarize, Mountz (2013) points out that four major themes emerged within this discussion on sovereignty: (1) design of spatial metaphors to conceptualize sovereignty, (2) study of exceptional sites, (3) sustained attention to blurring of on and offshore sovereign productions, and (4) the search for distinct forms of power. In general, these works depart from the discussion promoted both by Agnew and by the growing reading among geographers of Agamben's work on the concept of exceptionalism and of Foucault on the concept of biopower. The metaphor of the vertebrate world – from a central spine of an international balance of power – and of the cellular world – parts organized by association and opportunity, not by legislation or defined territory – brought by Appadurai (2006) moves in this direction.

Recent articles continue to question the “indivisible, unitary, and final” character of the concept of sovereignty, especially in a world where the materiality of borders is re-emerging (Rosière, 2021). Longo (2017) analyzes how borders are becoming thicker and binational, projecting the search for security for kilometers into neighboring territory, making the border no longer the first line of defense, but the last. Longo (2017) advances in Agnew's discussion by debating the idea that there are degrees of sovereignty, that is, there are States with more or less sovereignty.

The author claims that we are stuck with two ideas that resist the concept of “sovereignty”: authority (*de jure*), linked to the Westphalian perspective, and control (*de facto*). In this sense, Longo says that we would be living in a new type of empire, which is distinguished from territorial sovereignty by the lack of clear and objective delimitation of the border. This work calls into question others who still persist in seeing in some phenomena – such as drug and goods trafficking – the indication of an attack on the sovereignty of the State, a position that should theoretically have already been overcome, in which sovereignty is viewed as “all or nothing” and not as a multifaceted regime, as Agnew argues. The unity between territory and sovereignty persists, even with the intense debate about the porosity of borders. Or, in the words of Longo (2017, 3), “we might first think of sovereignty not as binary – a state either is or is not sovereign over a jurisdiction – but rather as spectral”.

As I want to argue in this paper, sovereignty also functions as an important rhetorical discourse in geopolitics, what I am calling *sovereignty rhetoric*, that is, the concept of sovereignty and its spatialities are strategically and differently used by different political actors according to their interests in both national and international contexts. In this sense, the Brazilian case is an interesting example. Conveniently, John Agnew also used Brazil in his argument, helping us to interpret our object of analysis. As Agnew (1994) and Rise (2011) stated, the idea of limited sovereignty is not exclusive to developing countries.

In general, multiple sovereignty regimes co-exist in the Brazilian context, sometimes classical Westphalian, and sometimes globalist. According to John Agnew (and corroborated by contemporary facts⁵), when referring to the issue of migration, the Brazilian

5 For example, the request for the closure of the border by the government of the Brazilian northern state

sovereignty rhetoric is characterized by its self-identification as a “State of immigrants”, which is a globalist regime. On the other hand, Agnew notes that money is one of the main representatives of the state’s infrastructural power and that Brazil’s national currency domination (the Brazilian Real) within its territory is classical Westphalian, while its Latin American neighbors’ use of the US dollar as a primary or secondary currency, in addition to national currencies, is a more imperialist regime⁶. These and other themes reveal to us that different sovereignty discourses are activated depending on the topic in question.

Shah (2012) argued that the aforementioned ongoing discussions about the “territorial trap” in the sovereignty literature did not necessarily produce research that successfully avoids this problem. On the contrary, Shah observes, research on globalization, in general, explores sovereignty from the perspective of the impermeability of borders, thus reinforcing the trap. In addition, Shah argues that we should also focus on how the notion of global space produces a new political theory that opposes territory. It is in this sense that we can now analyze the case of ex-president Lula’s candidacy to illustrate how political motivations underpin the use of sovereignty rhetoric.

UN CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS PACTS: THE RHETORIC OF SOVEREIGNTY

As presented so far, I argue that the imbroglio of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva’s candidacy in 2018 for the presidential campaign can be interpreted as another moment in which the rhetoric of sovereignty is used to legitimize both the request for the candidate’s release and the denial of that request.

To analyze this case, I reviewed an online database of 12 hours of documentation of oral and written proceedings from the TSE judgment on the ex-president’s eligibility for candidacy, focusing specifically on references to sovereignty, using Iramuteq software⁷. The arguments of two judges are of primary importance here: that brought by the TSE rapporteur of the case, Minister Luís Roberto Barroso, and that brought by the only divergent vote, Minister Luiz Edson Fachin. In addition to them, some points brought by the lawyers of both the defendant and the prosecutor are also analyzed here. In all cases, the speeches are either quoted in full or the timestamp of the speech is cited for reader reference.

of Roraima and its denial by Supreme Court Minister Rosa Weber on August 6th, 2018. According to the minister, closing the state’s border with Venezuela is both unconstitutional and in breach of the international agreements and treaties ratified by Brazil, and thus, “it is not justified, due to the difficulties that the reception of refugees naturally brings, to go for the easiest solution to ‘close the doors’, equivalent to ‘closing your eyes’ and ‘crossing your arms’”. Excerpt from the article <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2018/08/06/rosa-weber-nega-fechar-fronteira-do-brasil-com-a-venezuela-mas-nao-revoga-decision-of-judge-who-sent-to-block.ghtml>. Accessed on 04.09.2019.

6 This sovereignty regime in the national currency may change soon from the possibility of opening dollar accounts in the country, something that is still prohibited. In a report on May 29th, 2019, the Brazilian Central Bank states that it is studying this possibility. Retrieved from <https://g1.globo.com/economia/noticia/2019/05/29/banco-central-estuda-medida-que-pode-permitir-conta-em-dolares-para-brasileiros.ghtml>. Accessed on 04.09.2019.


7 Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-YaUnN9QZXE>. Acessado dia 10/01/2022.

As a first and important point to note, there was unanimity among the Court's ministers about the candidate's ineligibility according to internal Brazilian regulation. All ministers, including the divergent minister, stated that it was indisputable that Lula was ineligible according to the Federal Constitution amended with the Clean Record Law. The divergent point, therefore, was whether the injunction issued by the UN Human Rights Commission (HRC) would have superseded the application of Brazilian law. Situations like this provide an opening for exploring how 'global' invokes new kinds of regulatory strategies (Bartelson, 2006; Shah, 2012). It is possible to position this decision of the HRC within what authors call global in terms of "radicalisation of democracy and the redistribution of political power" based on universal-human rather than territorial distributions of authority and identity" (Doucet, 2005; Held 2004).

As Minister Barroso put it, Lula's defense Coalition named "People Happy Again" claimed that the precautionary measure issued by the Human Rights Committee on August 17th, 2018 would have the power to suspend the candidate's ineligibility, "constituting a fact enough to remove any obstacle to his candidacy" (4 hours and 20 minutes – 4h20') and, therefore, "the Clean Record Law would not deny the supra legal character of the Pact" (4h21'). In his argument, the ministers had to consider whether this decision would have binding power within Brazilian internal rules.

In the initial presentations, defense lawyer Luis Fernando C. Pereira stated that "by adhering to the Pact, the Brazilian State adhered to the Commission's sovereignty, so that compliance is not acts of government [...] international commitments are State and not government" (4h55'). When representing the defendant, the lawyer made an openly favorable speech to the transfer of sovereignty, since, according to him, the main objective of international law would be the reduction of the power of States over political, civil and social rights, making it difficult for governments to act authoritarian. In this way, human rights would be a way of safeguarding the rights of minorities, deprioritizing the territorial importance of sovereignty. In this sense, the lawyer also argued that "no nation can change the concepts of democracy, freedom and human rights". The use of the word sovereignty here is important to highlight. If, as researchers in the field of international relations claim, "the strategic objective of the concept of sovereignty was to consolidate the territoriality of the modern state" (Lafer, 1995, p.137), what does it mean when someone says that the territorial state has to adhere the sovereignty of an international body?

A Prosecutor (*Ministério Público, MP*), one of the ten actors contesting the Lula coalition in the TSE, interpreted the notion of Human Rights differently. In addressing the idea presented by the defense that political rights are part of human rights, and, as such, human rights regulations should be above the internal rights of the State, the MP representative used another perspective on the subject, highlighting the relationship between corruption and human rights and the principle of good governance. For him, defending the Clean Record Law is related to Human Rights, because "corruption kills" (5h02') by diverting resources that would be used in different social spheres. By putting the idea of human rights into perspective, the Public Ministry aimed to attack one of the main contemporary themes that affect the classic idea of territorial State.



These arguments illustrate an example of two divergent interpretations of Human Rights, with different consequences for the idea of sovereignty. On the one hand, the defendant's lawyer stressed that Brazilian sovereignty on human rights was necessarily a globalist regime (as presented by Agnew), governed by adherence to the UN HRC. On the other hand, the Prosecutor emphasized its territorial regime. Thus, at stake was which kind of sovereignty regime would have the most strength in this legal process within the Brazilian political environment.

In the last few decades, there has been a noticeable growth in the variation of global human rights regimes and governmental behavior in countries' political and judicial practices. The universality of claims for freedoms and rights intrinsic to all human beings, as opposed to linked to and conferred by nation-states, suggests that territories should be prosecuted by this international legal system if they imposed barriers on people's cross-border movement when looking for a better life or to escape political persecution. As a result, critics have pointed out how justice will begin to move beyond international borders (Jacobson, 1996; Slaughter, 2004). The conceptual landscape of justice and human rights, now interwoven, will make sovereignty regimes even more complex.

Another contestant to the Lula coalition, the political party *Partido Novo* (New Party) stated that the Brazilian legal system should respect the UN institution, but not shape the behavior of "our interpretive agents. It is up to our legal system to assess the design in accordance with our domestic law to international demonstrations" (5h18'). The argument brought by *Partido Novo* brought an element that was always fundamental when forging loyalty to the State: the possessive pronoun "ours", whose construction is always established in opposition to "theirs" (Said, 2007). As already mentioned in the previous section, the dichotomy between "us" and "them" was fundamental to the formation of the modern State, based on the construction of a national identity (or "imagined societies", as defined by Anderson, 2008), from cultural artifacts or even wars (Herbst, 1990). The State is a socio-spatial construction that constantly needs ideological reinforcement for its existence, and, in moments of peace, other strategies (deliberate or not) need to be outlined. In a contemporary international context marked by decades of speeches in favor of globalization and supranational agreements, resistance movements for the defense of the State are gaining strength, through electoral processes and institutional reactions. The use of the pronoun "our" by political party *Partido Novo*, like the MP prosecutor, relies on a territorial regime for the interpretation of sovereignty.

As stated by Newman (2010) "If the nature of a trap is to teach others, then the nature of the territorial trap is to prevent others from entering those spaces which are deemed safe and comfortable". "Safe" and "comfortable" here mean not ceding sovereignty on the most delicate political issue of the last decade in Brazil to a supranational institution. "Us" and "them" are important discourses in the construction of identities, as Murphy (2010) notes from Agnew's discussion. As a result, the relationship between territorial structures and territorial ideas remains underexamined and undertheorized" (Murphy, 2010, p.769), since in the discourse of the *Partido Novo* the conceptual conflation of the

terms nation and state is visible – a notable example of the territorial trap’s influence on conceptions of identity.



Partido Novo’s argument above found support from the “Brazil above all, God above all” coalition (whose presidential candidate was Jair Bolsonaro), whose very coalition name is a defense of a classical Westphalian sovereignty regime. This view aligns with the work of Michael Mann, that is, the idea of the State is an autonomous actor, reinforcing the dichotomies of we *versus* they and “from within” *versus* “from outside”, iconographic forces that resist globalist flows.

It cannot be overstated, as many political geographers have already argued, that the State is not a single actor, but is full of internal fragmentation and constant challenges. It is in this sense that the use of the pronoun “our” needs to be problematized. The conception of territory and its border areas is inherently historical, that is, sometimes territory is seen as a demarcation of space protected by the same force of legitimate, dominant violence (the State), while at other times it is seen as a space that can be used for cooperation. Thus, even though the classic function of protection, defense and estrangement from the “other” is still relevant (Silva *et al.*, 2019⁸), Brazilian sovereignty rhetoric in practice and/or in theory, had in the past decades other interpretations about the border phenomenon. Many geographers, for example, have interpreted geopolitics in recent decades from a conception not centered on the nation-state, calling this analysis, *fragmented geopolitics*, “a geopolitical thought directed to small spaces and small geopolitical games by governments and non-state agents” (Machado *et al.*, 2014, p.15).

However, the TSE trial demonstrated that Brazilian sovereignty needs to be analyzed in a more complex way, not only stating that the “forces of iconography” are “winning” over the forces of circulation (in the words of Gottmann), and strengthening the despotic power and state infrastructure (in Mann’s terms), but that there are multiple sovereignty regimes that coexist (in Agnew’s terms). The TSE’s almost unanimous decision demonstrated that for this case the Brazilian legal system decided to act in a territorial manner. Being a decision by an institution of territorial sovereignty, we can see that the decision is not “natural”, the result of “obvious” Brazilian state sovereignty, but rather a product of a specific international and national historical-spatial context.

The ruling against former President Lula’s presidential candidacy serves as evidence that the traditional discourse that views the State as a single and indivisible actor still predominates in law. As Kuus and Agnew (2008) point out, the usual pronouncement about the “interests of the State” as causes for foreign policies illustrates the idea of the State as a pre-existing subject and an autonomous individual. This conception, rooted in the political tradition of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke, is a crucial pillar of the international system of states. In the vote of the TSE minister rapporteur, phrases such as “the

8 The work of Silva *et al.* (2019) demonstrates the different modes of treatment that the Brazilian State confers to its borders, both temporally and spatially. In the case mentioned above, there were moments when the Brazil-French Guiana border was in the phase of isolation-remoteness and today, with the construction of the binational bridge, there is an important change for its integration.



Brazilian State was not heard” (4:29’) and “therefore, the version of the State is unknown” (4:33’) are clear examples of this traditional discourse.

Luiz E. Facchin, the only divergent voting minister, argued that the decision of the Human Rights Committee would be sufficient for Lula to gain permission to be a candidate. According to him, the TSE should accept the decision in *good faith*, an important legal principle both internally and internationally, since, as a signatory to the Vienna Convention, supranational institutions have become legitimate actors in the Brazilian legal system.

The Convention cited by the minister has its origins in the 1960s, but it was only ratified by the Brazilian Congress in 2009 and aimed to define and standardize issues related to international law. Principles such as “free consent”, “good faith” and the “norm of international law” support the idea that the State cannot invoke its domestic law to justify non-compliance with a treaty to which it is a party (Chiappini, 2011). In this contemporary geopolitical context, even the legal sovereignty of the territorial regime starts to coexist with more globalist regimes. As commentators have claimed (Mazzuoli, 2011; Husek, 2006), the principle of good faith in Article 18 presupposes that States would refrain from performing acts capable of “frustrating the object and purpose of the treaty before its entry into force” (Rezek, 2006, p.497). According to Facchin, the Brazilian State would, therefore, have to respect the common sense of the treaties, since the Treaty of Treaties (as the Vienna Convention is known) is considered one of the most important documents in the history of International Public Law, built during decades of pacifying context.

After the Vienna Convention, according to minister Facchin, it would not be up to the TSE to use the argument of the absence of a presidential decree to validate the Human Rights Commission, since this historical practice would not be constitutionally required. Using this argument would be a way of invoking jurisprudence and denying an international agreement. The minister argues that “the Committee’s own decision in its general comment 31, in its fifth article, states that in the event of inconsistency between that pact and the domestic rights of States, article two requires that domestic law or practice be changed to meet the requirements imposed [...] by the pact” (6h11’). Finally, Facchin says that “to affirm that only with a presidential decree does a treaty become valid, we have to assume that we deny the Vienna Convention’s validity [...] Me, as a Minister, do not feel authorized to do this”.

On the other hand, the argument of minister Luiz Barroso, whose decision led all the other six votes against it, used the word sovereignty in his initial argument. Barroso stated that the Federal Constitution constitutes the “transfer of popular sovereignty” and, therefore, since “politics created the Law, through the Constitution and the Legislation, after having created it, it submits to it” (3h58’). Thus, Barroso states that it is possible to have a dual position between internal order and international order, that is, we could defend the protocol in an international order, but not internally. For him, therefore, “the recommendation of the UN Human Rights Committee [...] is not comparable, as the defense ingeniously maintained, [...] to the Brazilian judicial decision to withdraw eligibility” (4h46’).


Barroso makes it clear, however, that the Court could comply if it wanted the recommendation, although it is not mandatory. According to Barroso, “with this dialogue,

[...], I conclude that, in addition to not having binding force, but it could be accepted as a recommendation. However, I think that this is not the case for this set of arguments that I consider very relevant” (4h47’). This means that the decision to deny Lula’s candidacy was, after all, a choice of TSE, valuing domestic law more than recommendations by an international Committee. From the understanding of the scale of the political phenomenon (Moore, 1998), it is impossible to dissociate this decision from a resurgence of nationalist ideologies in Brazil and in the world. As stated by Agnew (2010, p.779) in an article in response to commentators on his work, “the claim to territorial sovereignty is an inherent element in nationalist ideologies”.

It is also in Barroso’s decision that we find another element that helps us to understand the final decision of the Court. The decision illustrates that territorial regime sovereignty is connected with the international context of the State’s response to the forces of globalization, and as such we cannot also minimize the importance of the national context on the TSE decision. According to Barroso, “the internal courts have to pay attention to the Constitution [which represents popular sovereignty] and also to its historical conditions, cultural specificities and political inclinations of the political will of its people that make up the local constitutional culture” (4h36’). The minister, during an important part of his vote, emphasized the opportunity of the Brazilian population to fight against corruption, reflected in the millions of signatures of the Popular Initiative Law (participatory democracy mechanism introduced in the 1988 Constitution) which generated the Clean Record Law. It is possible to affirm, therefore, that the Court’s decision was in line with public opinion. (Indeed, the majority of Brazilian voters voted to enact the Clean Record Law and in 2018, 84% of Brazilians supported the continuation of the Lava Jato investigation⁹). If, as Barroso stated, the Constitution reflects the sovereignty of the people and since the Clean Record Law was incorporated into the Brazilian Constitution, denying it in favor of an international Commission would delegitimize the State-territory-people triad foundational to the concept of the sovereign state. Caspersen (2012) points out that the inter-state system has not created alternative strategies, but has lived with them.

Thus, in a situation in which a State measure allegedly violates an international treaty, Barroso defended the use of a doctrine that, according to him, would be constantly used in the European system. According to him, in situations like this, the European Court of Human Rights created *the margin of appreciation doctrine*, that is, it should “give the State a certain margin of appreciation in the implementation of measures that interfere with its internal order, in order to preserve its sovereignty and a space of freedom for the State to integrate and implement international standards” (4h35’). For Barroso, therefore, the eligibility restriction is “based on a law endowed with a high degree of democratic legitimacy supported by judicial decisions of the first instance of federal jurisdiction, and the second instance unanimously. After that, the Superior Court of Justice and the Supreme Court had not suspended the decision” (4h38’).

9 www1.folha.uol.com.br/amp/poder/2018/04/para-84-dos-brasileiros-lava-jato-deve-continuar-12-defendem-termino.shtml Accessed on 02/02/2020.



After reviewing the Barroso's arguments and the only contrary Minister's vote, the other five ministers followed Barroso's vote, ending the score six votes against the ex-president's candidacy and only one vote in favor. As both the defense and prosecution lawyers said, this trial was a milestone for Brazilian law: once again, the concept of sovereignty proved to be inherently political. More than that, this process demonstrates that for a complete understanding of the State, it is necessary to understand how territory is shaped by it; but even more, how the territory (and discourses about) shapes and forges the power of the modern state (Shah, 2012). Shah (2012, p.60) states that even if power operates in all sorts of incongruent ways, territory can remain the ideal regulatory center.

The analysis corroborates what Newman (2010) stated about the poor binaries of analyzing sovereignty either as a fixed territory or as lacking materiality, just flows. As he said, "we have a world where the constant power and reconfiguration of fixed territories, through a system of ordering, takes place at one and the same time as the dynamics of cross-border flows and networks" (Newman, 2010, p.775). The Electoral Supreme Court debate shows that "territorial principle of jurisdiction" is still strong and important to geopolitics' purpose (Hudson, 1998).

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Based on a conception of diffuse power that draws from philosophical sources like Michel Foucault and departs from the traditional conception of Political Geography centered on the idea of the national territorial State, John Agnew suggested in *Globalization and Sovereignty* (2018) that there are different spatialities of sovereignty, in addition to the established idea of territory. This does not mean that the author has minimized the importance of geographical factors in the debate on this concept, quite the contrary, what he sought was to point out that the territory would become a conceptual prison, a "trap" in which political geographers placed themselves, and one which would prevent them from analyzing spatial dynamics distinct from the role of political power.

This analysis is important because it reinforces the idea that the State is a social construction that needs different discourses to survive in the international political system. I suggest that one of the main mediums of political debate about the concept of sovereignty is what have called the different *rhetoric of sovereignty*. This concept offers us a tool to move away from the false idea of "the end of the State", harangued within analyses of globalization, and toward an understanding of the different spatialities of sovereignty. As Agnew stated, for political geographers, their key questions should not be about the "real" meaning of state sovereignty in a universal sense, but how state power is produced in their speeches and operated mutually in territorial and non-territorial ways.

I reinforce Agnew's argument, by demonstrating that sovereignty is a phenomenon of multiple spatialities and I suggest that these modalities will be more or less reinforced according to the prevailing geopolitical discourse in both current international and national contexts. The request for the defense of ex-President Lula in UN Human Rights Commission and his denial by the TSE both used valid arguments that triggered the idea

of sovereignty differently. The rhetoric of globalist regime sovereignty prevailed in the first, while the territorial regime was clear in the second. Undoubtedly, the international geopolitical context of revaluing the scale of the State in a supposed “fight” against the forces of circulation, and the internal Brazilian context against corruption can be seen as important cyclical aspects that explain the Court’s decision. As Agnew (2010, p.784) pointed out “the territorial claims of nationalists are often based in attempting to join in on what have been called ‘sovereignty games’ in which the sovereignty ‘ideal’ is used strategically to reorganize existing relationships between power, legitimacy and territoriality”. Thus, different sovereignty regimes are important to maintain the very materiality of the idea of the State, otherwise the entire political system would dissolve. It is in this tension that the State exists in the globalized world: with actors choosing in which battles to use the Westphalian sovereignty card, in which it is assumed that the territorial State is a myth.

Finally, in defending, as Agnew did, that no country in the world at any time in history would have exercised or “possessed” sovereignty in its fullness, we are not claiming that this condition does not exist. I do not claim that “sovereignty is an organized hypocrisy” (Krasner, 1999), but I suggest it functions also as a rhetorical tool in a debate, which helps us to understand that sovereignty is heterogeneous. In other words, sovereignty has much more power as a political discourse than as a practice, activated when players on the geopolitical board need to highlight a value that is intended to be both universal and the foundation of the modern state. In short, sovereignty is not absolute, but divisible on certain topics – money, migration, environment, etc. In this sense, political geographers have as one of their tasks to demonstrate that speaking *for* the State is talking *about* the State, that is, the discourse of sovereignty allows and conditions the spatial exercise of power.

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